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There are continual debates regarding the effectiveness of United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1803 and 1929 as tools for limiting the Islamic Republic 
of Iran’s goals for a nuclear program.  This thesis examines the enforceability of the 
maritime sections of both resolutions at the police level in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries.  Arab nations along the Arabian Gulf have had long-standing maritime 
trade relations with Iran and the greater Indian Ocean that extend generations into history.  
This relationship led to the extensive merging of Arab and Persian cultures in the GCC, 
as well as the growth of an immigrant workforce from South Asia.  With this influx of 
identities and nationalities, challenges were developed in enforcing both resolutions, 
specifically as it relates to the inspection of Iranian maritime cargo.  Alongside this 
merging of cultures, is the growth of successful maritime drug-smuggling networks that 
weapons proliferators could exploit to intentionally violate UNSCR 1803 and 1929.  
Based on the challenges of maritime trade, cultural and national identity, as well as 
criminal activity, it is argued that both resolutions are an unnatural fit in the Arabian 
Gulf, and are therefore questionable as policy choices in the GCC countries. 
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Analyzing the overall effectiveness of a United Nations sanction at the law-
enforcement level is an important endeavor.  This type of focused inquiry diminishes the 
possibility of a stakeholder developing a false sense of security about the sanction’s 
ability to stop the questionable activity of a targeted nation or entity.  The need for 
examination is none more evident than with the ongoing debate related to United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1803 and 1929, both of which were designed to 
limit the ambitions of an Iranian government nuclear program, as well as to disrupt the 
international financial network of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.  One shared 
theme in both resolutions is their specific targeting of Iranian activity that occurs in the 
maritime domain, specifically within the complexities that are present in international 
shipping.  For example, both resolutions request that governments monitor the activity of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, as well as all Iranian cargo that law 
enforcement authorities deem suspicious. 
Bruce Riedel of the Center for Strategic Studies argues that these two resolutions 
are so effective that they stopped foreign nations from selling, and subsequently, 
delivering weapons and other suspect material to Iran.1  This statement is applauded for 
its optimism, but it is making the assumption that all countries are operating with 
maximum diligence in enforcing the resolution on a daily basis.  Maritime cargo that 
could be used to deliver sanctioned items can be directly delivered to Iranian ports via 
various flagged vessels, or it can pass through the complicated port systems of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as a legitimate import, where it is then redirected 
to Iran on another vessel.  It is the latter of these two scenarios where policy analysis 
needs to be focused in order to determine whether UNSCR 1803 and 1929 are being 
enforced on a daily basis in a manner that prevents the undermining of both resolutions. 
Furthermore, many scholars are ignoring the facilitating ability of illegal drug 
networks in the Arabian Gulf when determining the overall effectiveness of these 
                                                 
1 Bruce Riedel, “Iran-U.S.: After the Iranian Bomb,” Center for Strategic Research, Institute for 
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, September 30, 2011, 4. 
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resolutions.  Sanctioned cargo destined for Iran can be transported through the maritime 
links that were established to support the Arabian Gulf drug trade, which extends to both 
the Arab and Persian coastlines.  Not only then does the profit-making ability of drug 
trafficking undermine the financial restrictions of both resolutions, but the transportation 
structures of the illegal trade also create a hybrid where drugs and sanctioned material 
can be transported via the same maritime route.  Additionally, the continuance of the 
Arabian Gulf illegal drug market reinforces that UNSCR 1803 and 1929 are challenged, 
and possibly inept, from their inception because stopping the transportation of sanctioned 
Iranian illicit cargo is ultimately dependent on countries in the region being able to 
eliminate the smuggling of illegal drugs via maritime means in its entirety. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis focuses its attention on the under-researched side of enforcing UNSCR 
1803 and 1929.  As background, the United Nations implemented both resolutions in 
response to Iran’s inability to cease their suspect nuclear program.  The sections listed 
within these resolutions focus on various aspects of the Iranian regime: the Quds Force, 
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, Iranian banking, and their maritime shipping 
industry as some examples.  U.S. law enforcement takes a very aggressive approach to 
supporting UNSCR 1803 and 1929.  Security forces overseas take a different stance 
depending on their location in the world.  For example, many Western European 
countries actively police these resolutions; however, some regions in the world do not 
because of various cultural factors that seem irrelevant to U.S. law enforcement. 
One region in particular that has found itself in the center of illicit Iranian 
maritime activity, and therefore at the center of this debate, is the maritime domain that 
extends from Kuwait’s Bubiyan Island to the Southern coast of Oman.   This region is 
important because, based on the sharing of the Arabian Gulf with Iran, it acts as a final 
bulwark against illicit maritime cargo destined for the Islamic Republic.  It is through this 
framework that this thesis questions the effectiveness of UNSCR 1803 and 1929 as useful 
strategies in the GCC countries.  Specifically, can these two U.N. resolutions be 
 3 
successfully policed in a manner that overcomes the three dominant challenges of trade, 
identity, and illegal networks found in the Arabian Gulf?  
Many factors influence the success, or lack thereof, of an international law 
enforcement policy: domestic politics, local demand, and host-nation police abilities to 
name a few.  As will be shown in this thesis, when it comes to effectively policing both 
UNSCR 1803 and 1929, law enforcement activity in the GCC falls victim to economic 
and social histories that are intertwined with Iran in everything from maritime trade to 
family lineages, as well as from the influx of an immigrant workforce that directly 
supports the security activities in the GCC port system.  It is the nature of maritime trade 
to build connections between nations, cultures, and people; a phenomenon that ultimately 
makes enforcing both resolutions in the Arabian Gulf a challenged endeavor.   
Furthermore, the success of the Arabian Gulf’s illegal drug trade reflects the 
inability of effectively policing both resolutions in the GCC countries.  Even though the 
reasons for an enforcement policy being futile transcend many levels of a nation’s 
government and society, this thesis strictly focuses on historic trade with Iran, the mixing 
of national identities, and smuggling networks in the Arabian Gulf.  Arab and Persian 
maritime trade has existed for hundreds of years, something that ultimately led to a multi-
cultural workforce in the GCC.  This influx of maritime workers led to ideological 
challenges, as well as the development of criminal smuggling networks that could be 
used to transport material outlawed under both resolutions.  Based on these 
characteristics, this thesis argues in the end, that GCC countries proactively enforcing 
UNSCR 1803 and 1929 in the Arabian Gulf region is not realistic. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Department of the Navy instruction states that understanding the maritime 
environment is important for identifying those international threats that occur in the 
maritime domain that have the potential to negatively impact the United States.2  
Examining the effectiveness and the enforceability of UNSCR 1803 and 1929 meets that 
requirement because both resolutions have several sections of text that focus on Iranian 
                                                 
2 U.S. Department of the Navy, “SECNAV Instruction 3052.1,” January 30, 2009. 
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maritime activity as it relates to the complete port systems of other nations.  Additionally, 
the analysis undertaken in this thesis supports the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Domain 
Awareness mission, specifically in regards to mitigating questionable Iranian maritime 
activity in the Arabian Gulf and GCC countries. 
The importance of examining challenges that directly affect the enforcement and 
policing ability of UNSCR 1803 and 1929 is found in the potential outcomes that can 
occur if the overall opinion of these resolutions’ effectiveness is based on misleading 
information.  A recent article in the Stanford Journal of International Relations advises 
that due to the serious nature of Iran obtaining materials needed for a nuclear program, 
participating countries need to evaluate if both resolutions are making a difference in 
deterring illicit Iranian government activity.3  Information gathered during the process of 
this thesis will directly contribute to that analytical process through a presentation of 
material on the GCC countries, which are considered partnering nations with 
international law enforcement efforts.  When trying to find the solution to security 
vulnerabilities, an examination must be undertaken to find the root causes that were the 
catalysts or facilitators of the questionable activity to exist or flourish.  In regard to this 
thesis, that vulnerability is the question of enforceability of both UNSCR 1803 and 1929 
in the Arabian Gulf. 
The probability of these resolutions failing is directly correlated to the ability of 
GCC law enforcement to be proactive in supporting the sections listed in UNSCR 1803 
and 1929.  If both these resolutions were not enforced on a daily basis to their maximum 
potential, the possibility exists for Iran to obtain sanctioned items and materials that are 
required to further a nuclear weapons program, as well as dual-use technology that could 
be manipulated into equipment for Iran’s armed forces.  In the GCC region, like 
elsewhere, the responsibility of limiting this activity belongs to the Customs Division and 
Coast Guard; both of which are part of their respective countries’ Ministries of Interior.  
Additionally though, it is also incumbent upon all maritime shipping companies in the 
Arabian Gulf to police themselves and their trade transactions in order to ensure that they 
                                                 
3 Regan Thompson, “The Effectiveness of the Fourth Round of Sanctions Against Iran,” Stanford 
Journal of International Relations 13, no. 1 (2011): 7–8. 
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are not inadvertently, or intentionally, violating both resolutions through the common 
business practices that occur between the GCC countries and Iran every day.  At the 
advanced level, there should be a marriage of law enforcement and maritime businesses 
that acts as a community-policing model with the specific goal of limiting activity within 
a port environment that is contrary to both resolutions.  Criminal justice scholars describe 
this concept as focusing on “hotspots” or “location targeting”, which involves law 
enforcement entities using a regional approach to identify suspicious activity in order to 
develop tactics to deter or limit it.4 
Any disclosed or discovered challenges to the effectiveness of policing these 
resolutions can allow GCC law enforcement leadership the opportunity to make the 
necessary adjustments in their overall strategies and priorities in order to have a more 
positive impact on international resolutions related to Iran.  The same is true for U.S. law 
enforcement strategies that function alongside as part of global partnerships.  If a 
weakness is identified in a partnering nation, adjustments can be made to U.S. security 
policies.  For example, U.S. law enforcement agencies can initiate more foreign law 
enforcement training and joint operations, initiate unilateral enforcement programs, or 
pursue other proactive diplomatic measures.  As Professor John Mearsheimer of the 
University of Chicago states, the resolutions that international organizations produce are 
challenged because they lack a specific enforcement arm that can ensure nations are 
doing their part in deterring questionable activity.5  In the Arabian Gulf, the success of 
UNSCR 1803 and 1929 is reliant upon GCC police forces acting proactively in an 
enforcement capacity without allowing trade, identity, and successful smuggling 
networks to undermine their efforts. 
C. KEY FINDINGS 
 Historic trade with Iran, identity, and criminal smuggling networks all negatively 
impact the ability for GCC law enforcement to effectively police Iranian sanctions in the 
                                                 
4 Roger Gaspar, “Tackling International Crime, Forward into the Third Era,” Combating International 
Crime: The Longer Arm of the Law, ed. Steven D. Brown (New York: Routledge, 2008), 13–14. 
5 John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 
(1994-95): 5–49.  
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Arabian Gulf maritime domain.  Based on global partnerships, these challenges also 
transcend themselves to the policing efforts of other nations because as common practice, 
foreign law enforcement is reliant upon the success and proactivity of their GCC 
counterparts.  The level of these challenges is not the same throughout each Gulf country, 
but if even one obstacle is significant, the ability to police UNSCR 1803 and 1929 is 
diminished.  For example, if criminal smuggling networks do not drastically affect one 
country, the ability to enforce Iranian sanctions may be limited because that nation may 
conduct legitimate trade with Iran, which as will be shown can provide benign avenues 
for smuggling illicit material. 
In regard to maritime trade, the ability of GCC law enforcement to proactively 
enforce UNSCR 1803 and 1929 is limited because of the significant maritime economic 
connections that exist between the Arabian Gulf countries and Iran.  Civilizations found 
on the Arabian Peninsula have been using the waters of the Gulf to exchange goods for 
centuries.  Through this commerce, residents of both coasts emigrated to the other, 
bringing with them their specific cultural and religious identities.  This cross-
culturalization occurred not only through peaceful means.  The Sassanid Dynasty of the 
Persian Empire expanded its territory to include the Musandam Peninsula in modern 
Oman through conquest.  Naval warfare between Islamic tribes in Arabia against Persian 
fighters led to transplanting an Arab presence on modern Iran.  
Years of Arabian Gulf trade and conquest led to some citizens of the GCC 
countries having extensive generational family linages that return to Iran.  This 
community is known as the Ajam community.  The Arabic term Ajam is the plural form 
for Persians, and stems from the Arabic verb Ajm, which translates to becoming 
unintelligible or un-Arab.  Ajam can be used in the singular form Ajami, which is also the 
word used to specifically describe something that is of Iranian origin.6  In the modern 
Arabian Gulf dialect, Ajam is commonly used to describe GCC citizens that are of 
Iranian descent and heritage.  Some GCC citizens argue, and Iranians as well, that the 
term Ajam can be used to describe GCC citizens of Arab origin that married Iranian 
                                                 
6 Hans Wehr, Arabic-English Dictionary: The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, ed. 
JM Cowan (Urbana: Spoken Language Services, 1993), 694. 
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citizens, GCC citizens of Arab origin that married GCC citizens of Iranian heritage, 
therefore linking an Arab family to that of an Ajam, and finally, to all Iranian citizens 
who reside in a GCC country. 
Some members of the Ajam community work in GCC law enforcement, as well as 
shipping companies that directly operate with Iranian businesses as part of an Arab-
Iranian intertwined maritime economy.  Many of those Ajam families are senior 
executives at shipping agencies that do business with Iranian companies directly targeted 
under UNSCR 1803 and 1929.  Others work in law-enforcement positions that are 
charged with policing the maritime domain.  This thesis does not intend to show any 
particular person or Ajami family being suspected of violating these resolutions, but it 
will show how the GCC’s natural and historic commerce with Iran, combined with 
interlocking heritages, does facilitate activities that undermine both resolutions both 
intentionally, as well as inadvertently. 
Furthermore, the GCC law-enforcement policy of using the South Asian immigrant 
workforce to complement policing activities in the maritime domain is an additional layer 
that undermines both resolutions.  This policy is not designed to specifically degrade the 
effectiveness of UNSCR 1803 and 1929; however, through its implementation it 
inadvertently does.  After a flourishing oil industry created a demand for workers, GCC 
countries developed a significant population that fits into this category.  Some of these 
workers do find themselves in positions where both resolutions need to be proactively 
enforced on a daily basis.  It is no fault of their own, but as a workforce they are not 
trained in the necessary enforcement skills needed to execute both resolutions, and in the 
most extreme example, some are not concerned about the overall goal that both 
resolutions were designed to accomplish.  
As a byproduct of this multi-national immigration, networks were developed in 
the Arabian Gulf to facilitate the continual maritime drug trade that exists between the 
GCC and neighboring countries.  These criminal structures directly weaken law 
enforcement efforts to support UNSCR 1803 and 1929.  The demand in the GCC for 
illegal drugs is growing, and the supply is provided through trafficking networks that 
Ajam, Iranians, Pakistanis, GCC citizens, and other Arab nationalities all coordinate.  
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Through established linkages between supplier, trafficker, and distributer, the ability to 
enforce both resolutions is challenged from the beginning because outlawed material can 
simply follow the routes that are coordinated within these illegal drug networks, or they 
can simply be trafficked through criminal organizations that operate in the Arabian Gulf 
maritime domain. 
D. SOURCES AND METHODS 
This thesis is a result of two years of fieldwork conducted by the author in the 
GCC supporting UNSCR 1803 and 1929.  Based on a lack of published information and 
research pertaining to the enforceability of these resolutions at the various levels of law 
enforcement, as well as within the different sections of maritime shipping, much of the 
primary evidence presented comes from firsthand accounts based on supporting the U.S. 
Navy’s Maritime Domain Awareness mission.  This is mostly the case in those sections 
where cultural identity undermines the effectiveness of both resolutions, as well as with 
the section pertaining to the illegal drug trade.  This strategy results in a unique 
opportunity: the marriage of scholarship with international policing at the street level in 
order to determine the effectiveness of an international policy.  Additional sources used 
in this thesis come from published books and journals on the historic maritime trade in 
the Arabian Gulf, as well as from similar works that relate to identity and the GCC’s 
history as it relates to Iran.  In regard to maritime shipping and violations of UNSCR 
1803 and 1929, information provided came from journal articles, news reports, and 
official U.S. government documents from the Congressional Research Service, U.S. 
Department of Treasury, and other agencies.  Of additional importance was the use of 
certain Arab media as it relates to security concerns in the GCC, as well as information 
that Arabian Gulf research centers provided on illegal drug networks. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis focuses on the enforcement vulnerabilities of UNSCR 1803 and 1929 
in the Arabian Gulf maritime domain.  To support the arguments presented, Chapter II of 
this thesis will provide an overview of the historic maritime trade in the Arabian Gulf, 
specifically the developed links between Iran and the GCC.  Chapter III of this will 
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examine the identities that emerged as a result of trade and oil development in the GCC. 
Additionally, Chapter III will examine incidents where identity has inadvertently, as well 
as intentionally, undermined the enforcement of UNSCR 1803 and 1929.  Chapter IV 
examines the maritime smuggling networks that exist in the Arabian Gulf, as well as the 
overall drug trade atmospherics that exist in the region and their role in undermining both 
resolutions.  Chapter V will discuss the use of sanctions as an enforcement tool within a 
nation’s choices for using force in order to guarantee compliance, as well as discuss the 
policing mechanisms associated with UNSCR 1803 and 1929 that are needed to 
overcome trade links and identity.  To conclude, Chapter VI will summarize the key 
















II. MARITIME TRADE IN THE ARABIAN GULF’S HISTORY 
This chapter examines the multinational characteristics of the Arabian Gulf 
maritime trade industry in a historical context.  Over generations this merging of nations 
led to the creation of Arab social and cultural linkages with not only the countries of the 
greater Indian Ocean, but with the Islamic Republic of Iran as well.  The most germane to 
UNSCR 1803 and 1929 are the connections that exist with Iran, connections that remain 
strong to the present day.  From this research, it will be shown that the historical level of 
maritime interactions between the GCC and Iranian lands are so pronounced, that it 
makes modern GCC law enforcement efforts in policing UNSCR 1803 and 1929 an 
extremely challenged, and sometimes impossible, endeavor.  The Arabian Gulf is 
historically a focal point for maritime trade between the GCC and the Islamic Republic.  
If a U.N. resolution is issued that attempts to thoroughly police that trade, then the 
everyday benign shipping transactions are now viewed through a criminal lens.  This 
implementation of an unnatural policy results in port workers, maritime shipping 
companies, and even local port authorities arguing that both resolutions hinder the normal 
profit-making aspects of their regional maritime economy.  
A. OVERVIEW OF ARAB-IRANIAN MARITIME TRADE  
Throughout history, the traditional dhow fleets of the Arab Peninsula and Persian 
lands participated together in a robust regional trade.  As time progressed, the maritime 
transportation of goods began to include the use of modern merchant vessels; however, 
many sailors held-fast to the classical modes of Arabian Gulf seafaring.  Regardless of 
the means of travel, maritime trade in the region did connect Arab traders and merchants 
with their Persian equivalents.  In his book Monsoon, Professor Robert Kaplan 
emphasizes the historic maritime connections of the GCC countries with the greater 
Indian Ocean through his description of the region as being “a world of trade.”  Kaplan 
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further describes that within this framework, Arab and Persian traders “mingled together 
to do business” in a structure of different “civilizations.”7 
Dr. Lawrence Potter, an Arabian Gulf historian, argues that “for millennia” the 
countries surrounding the Gulf have been interconnected through extensive maritime 
trade networks.  This combining of cultures led to a seafaring identity that involved the 
“interchange of people, commerce, and religious movements.”8  This description of Gulf 
maritime activity has survived to the present day, and shows no signs of diminishing.  A 
person need only take a couple of steps in a GCC port to hear the language of their 
Persian neighbor conducting business transactions prior to loading either an indigenous 
dhow or modern cargo vessel.    
Maritime economics scholar Dr. Martin Stopford explains that the Arabian Gulf is 
part of the larger Indian Ocean maritime territory, which connects the Arabian Peninsula 
and Iran to India, Pakistan, and the Eastern countries of Africa.  The Gulf’s primacy as a 
center for maritime trade emerged approximately five thousand years in history through 
the sea routes that encircled modern day India, Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain.  During this 
period, the trade commodities of choice were oils, dates, and copper.  This market 
flourished because of the Gulf’s geographical features of being a protected coastal area.  
Optimistic of the benefits of a developed maritime trade network, the Persian Empire 
ultimately established a direct link from the Arabian Gulf region with the greater 
Mediterranean Sea.9  During the Persian Achaemenid period, the southern borders of 
their territory straddled the lines of what would now be considered the ports of Kuwait.10 
Many scholars point to the impact of Persian shipping on the Arabian Gulf as a 
clear indication that maritime trade between the coastlines flourished.  During the 
Sassanian period, Persian vessels conducted circular trade routes that transported their 
crew and cargo to modern-day Iraq, the GCC countries, and across the Straits of Hormuz.  
                                                 
7 Robert Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: 
Random House, 2010), 22–27. 
8 Lawrence G. Potter, The Persian Gulf in History ed. Lawrence G. Potter (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), 1. 
9 Martin Stopford, Maritime Economics, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 7, 362–364. 
10 Michael Axworthy, Empire of the Mind: A History of Iran (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 11. 
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Of most significance was the Sassanian influence that developed within the borders of 
Oman, where maritime characteristics from antiquity can still be found.11  Other scholars 
assert that Persian control over maritime activity in the Arabian Gulf was so powerful 
that their empire established successful trading ports on both sides of the Gulf.12 Late 
19th century traveler reports indicate evidence of Arab-Persian maritime connections 
being found as far away as the East African nations where the “fishermen are of Arab 
descent, the cultivators Persian.”13 
According to Middle East historian, Dr. John Townsend, the influence of the 
Persian Empire in Arabia is evident through the complex network of a “Persian irrigation 
system” that is present in Oman today.  Furthermore, Dr. Townsend states that when the 
Portuguese navy embarked on a conquest of Oman in the 16th century, many indigenous 
Omanis gave tribute and “allegiance to a Persian orientated monarch,” and later 
generations still felt as though some Omani citizens were ideologically torn between their 
homeland and Persia.  One of the primary reasons for this connection was maritime trade.  
According to Dr. Townsend, in the early 1800s the Imam of Oman desired to “expand 
Oman’s trade and influence, not hesitating to use force against the Persian coast when he 
thought it would strengthen his argument.”14   
Dr. Hala Fattah builds on these historic Arab and Persian linkages in her book The 
Politics of Regional Trade, wherein she states that in the mid-18th and early 19th 
centuries, the Northern Arabian Gulf was a “regional market” that included Basra, Iraq, 
Kuwait, and Southwest Iran (Arabistan).  The ports in this region were known as loading 
centers for cargo destined for India.  Furthermore, Dr. Fattah argues that many scholars 
                                                 
11 H.M. al-Naboodah, “The Commercial Activity of Bahrain and Oman in the Early Middle Ages,” 
Proceeding of the Seminar for Arabian Studies 22 (1992): 81; Bertold Spuler, “Trade in the Eastern Islamic 
Countries in the Early Centuries” in Islam and the Trade in Asia ed. D.S. Richards (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), 14. 
12 Andrew Williamson, “Persian Gulf Commerce in the Sassanian Period and the First Two Centuries 
of Islam,” Bastan Chenasi wa Honar-e-Iran 9–10 (1992): 97–109.; Touraj Daryaee, “Bazaars, Merchants, 
and Trade in Late Antique Iran,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 30, no. 3 
(2010): 405–409.  
13 A.W. Stiffe, “Former Trading Centres of the Persian Gulf,” The Geographical Journal 13, no. 3 
(1899): 294. 
14 John Townsend, Oman: The Making of the Modern State (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 26–27, 38–
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view the Northern Arabian Gulf as being divided through man-made barriers; however, 
these judgments ignore what she references as the broader context where the interaction 
was so strong between Arabs and Persians that a phenomenon of “social and commercial 
links” developed.15  These commercial ties remain steadfast, as it is a daily occurrence to 
see an Iranian cargo vessel loading and unloading various goods in a GCC port for 
transport to the Islamic Republic.   
Years have passed since this time period; however, the circular maritime trade 
route in this region still exists, and it is because of this continuance, that cargo is 
transported from the GCC countries to Iran on a daily basis.  Yet this benign trade 
industry does create avenues for illicit cargo to integrate itself with legitimate cargo.  
Some scholars assert that in today’s global society, illicit networks have morphed into 
those that would be considered legitimate.  In a recent article in Asia Pacific Defense 
Forum, it is argued that many illicit networks operate in the same manner that a global 
corporation would through influence in “transnational supply chains.”  The same article 
states that it would benefit international law enforcement if attention was placed on those 
sections of the shipping and transportation processes that play both a legitimate, as well 
as suspect, role in facilitating the movement of illicit goods.16 Meaning, not only should 
law enforcement focus efforts on a vessel’s cargo, but also on the structures of a port 
system where criminality may co-exist with benign trade transactions: company 
executives, shipping agents, etc.  This concept has merit in regards to UNSCR 1803 and 
1929, and should be implemented in the GCC; however, this tactic directly contradicts 
and disrupts the historic trade connections that existed between the GCC and Iran prior to 
the implementation of both resolutions. 
In his studies on maritime trade in the Arabian Gulf via the traditional dhow fleet, 
Dr. Dionisius Agius states that the maritime trade centers and ports of the region 
consisted of different cultures and nationalities.  Arabs who participated in maritime trade 
began to merge with those of the same occupation from other countries, ultimately 
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creating a mix of identities working together to further maritime trade.  Some of the 
prominent nationalities were Iranian and Indian.  As time progressed, those small inlets 
and harbors where the goal of commerce was priority, were transformed into the modern 
port structures of the GCC.17  For example, Shuwaikh Port in Kuwait where passenger 
and general cargo vessels transit the Arabian Gulf to Iran’s northern ports on a weekly 
basis, as well as Jebel Ali in Dubai where general cargo is re-exported to the central and 
southern Iranian ports.  Yet, with the development of modern port authorities and 
megaports, the small dhow harbor still exists.  For example, Doha Port in Kuwait on-
loads and offloads Iranian dhows twice a day, and Deira Creek heavily services the dhow 
fleets of Iran and India.  Regardless of size, both types of GCC maritime centers are 
equally vulnerable to being criminally, as well as governmentally, exploited.   
For example, in 2011 Mohammed Reza Vaghari was convicted for illegal trade 
activities with Iran between 2005 and 2008.  Primarily Vaghari was involved in exporting 
restricted technology via his U.S. company to shipping companies in the larger Dubai 
ports that were operating as front companies for the Iranian government.18  In another 
incident described in Arabian Business, Iran has developed a successful means around 
international sanctions.  Reportedly, gold is shipped from Turkey to Iran at a rate of 
several million USD per month via Dubai.  Analysts opine that this activity assists Iran’s 
economy because it gives the Iranian government another path around the banking 
restrictions of UNSCR 1803 and 1929.  Allegedly, the smuggled gold is transported from 
Dubai to Iran via the indigenous dhow fleet and smaller cargo vessels that cross the 
Arabian Gulf daily.19   
                                                 
17 Dionisius Agius, Seafaring in the Arabian Gulf and Oman: The People of the Dhow (London: 
Routledge, 2005), electronic Kindle edition. 
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B. GCC COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES 
When examining the maritime history of the GCC countries individually, Arabian 
Gulf maritime scholars state that in the mid-1950s Kuwait emerged as a regional trade 
center with activity traversing to Iran, and as far away as India.  Like the structure of 
ports worldwide, the immigration of permanent and transient workers increased in 
Kuwait, which led to the maritime community becoming diverse “ethnically, religiously, 
and culturally.”  Many of those who arrived originated in Iran, and traveled to Kuwait to 
participate in the growing maritime opportunities.  Common to many of the new Iranian 
immigrants, some also arrived with their religious belief in Shia Islam, which is the 
minority faith in Kuwait.  By the 1990s, the majority of trading dhows that were found in 
Kuwaiti harbors were Iranian flagged.20 This amount has ebbed and flowed through time 
as regional conflicts occurred, but today in Kuwait an entire port is dedicated to the 
Iranian dhow community.  Twice a day with the tide, dhows transporting agricultural 
products, fish, and small general cargo arrive from Iran, and subsequently depart with 
goods for the Iranian market. 
When looking at the historic and recent events in Bahrain that center on Iran and 
Shi’ism, it is difficult to believe that a maritime trade economy between the two countries 
would exist.  In his book on Bahrain’s military, Sheikh Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa 
emphasizes this point through descriptions of maritime conflicts that occurred between 
Arab and Persian commanders, which ultimately established an Arab footprint on the 
Persian side of the Arabian Gulf after several Arab victories.21 19th century Western 
military journals point to evidence of Persian architecture on Bahrain that is articulated as 
being from Persian Empire control of the Island in the 16th century.22  Yet, pearl fields 
located between Bahrain and the Iranian coast brought the two regions together.  Arabs 
living on the Persian side of the Gulf would travel to Bahrain to participate in the 
growing pearling trade.   This market further led to an influx of Iranian Shia into Bahrain, 
                                                 
20 Agius, Seafaring, electronic Kindle edition.  
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as well as led to the departure of tribal Arabs and “Arabized Iranians” who left Bahrain to 
establish maritime trade links in Southern Iran.  Today, evidence of this multi-national 
and multi-ethnic interconnectedness is visible in Bahrain’s local dhow fleet, which travels 
to Iran extensively via a circular course from Qatar and Dubai transporting cargo that is 
being re-exported to Iran from the larger shipping vessels.23 
According to the book Cargoes of the East, the dhow fleets of Saudi Arabia in the 
1970s participated heavily in trade with Iran of everything from electronics to luxury cars 
as part of efforts to get banned goods to buyers in the Islamic Republic.  During the same 
period, Iranian dhows would cross the Arabian Gulf carrying slabs of stone that would be 
used in Saudi construction, as well as illegal immigrants who would be used in the GCC 
labor force.24  All three activities are still practiced today.  Throughout the GCC dhows 
depart daily carrying goods that are needed in Iran.  The majority is harmless, but it is 
that 1% that could be used for purposes documented under UNSCR 1803 and 1929.  In 
his study on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Emanuele Ottolenghi describes 
this as “separating diapers from missiles.”25 
In regard to Qatar, prominent maritime scholars state that the dominant feature of 
the various Qatari ports is the large presence of Iranian dhows, followed second by those 
from India and Pakistan carrying benign general cargo.  Yet scholars further explain that 
it is common for some of the dhows to transport large automobiles to ports in Iran.26  
Scenarios like this are where the routine trade that is common to the Arabian Gulf 
straddles the line of being illicit cargo.  UNSCR 1803 and 1929 are specific in their 
sections about what material needs to be monitored to ensure the end-user is not an entity 
affiliated with Iran’s nuclear program or military.  Even though it may seem benign, 
automobile engines and parts could be diverted and used in Iranian military equipment.  
If one were to examine the actual amount of maritime trade that occurs between the two 
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countries, the vulnerabilities in enforcing both resolutions would easily be observed.  
According to Dr. Nader Habibi of Brandeis University, in the mid-1990s Qatar exported 
to Iran approximately 1 million USD worth of goods.  In 2008 that number rose 
 to 76 million USD, and subsequently dropped in 2009 to 52 million USD.27  
The ports of the United Arab Emirates are known in the maritime community for 
their abundance of international interaction via shipping; however, this characteristic has 
also led to the ports being quite notorious in law enforcement communities.  In Dubai, 
vessels flagged in China, Russia, and various African nations are found unloading large 
amounts of containers for the domestic market, as well as for re-export.  Historically, the 
various Emirates were known for their extensive trading networks that emerged from 
their coastlines.  Other than basic transactions of general cargo, these maritime 
communities also based their economies on fishing and pearling, with ports in Iran being 
key trading partners.  For example, Emirati dhow fleets conducted regular port calls in 
Iran’s Bandar Abbas for cargo exchanges.28  These Arab-Iranian transactions continue 
today; however, their benign nature can lead to Iranian government exploitation.  For 
example, in 2011, the U.S. Department of Treasury issued restrictions on the Iranian 
company Tidewater Middle East Co. because Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
owns and operates the maritime activities of that company.  One of the ports Tidewater 
controls is Shahid Rajaee Container Terminal in Bandar Abbas.  In recent years several 
incidents have occurred where foreign law enforcement outside of the Arabian Gulf have 
interdicted several vessels for transporting Iranian weapons in violation of Iranian 
sanctions.  During those incidents, all of the arms related material was loaded in Bandar 
Abbas for ultimate delivery to conflicts in the Levant.29  
In the early 1900s, many Persian maritime traders and merchants departed Iran 
and came to Dubai because of it being a major part of Arabian Gulf trade.  One location 
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in particular that caters to the international trading vessel fleet is Dubai’s Deira Creek.  
This location is known as being a bustling maritime center where dhows from not only 
Iran are found, but also Pakistan, India, Somalia, and Yemen.  According to Dr. Dionisius 
Agius, these fleets are lifelines for the “trade links between the impoverished non-Arab 
communities of other countries,” where everything from electronic equipment to building 
supplies are transported to the Persian side of the Arabian Gulf through smuggling 
networks of various nationalities.  Dr. Agius states that many Iranian seafarers in Dubai 
conduct transactions in basic Arabic, which represents the “cross fertilization of ideas as 
a result of the settlers interacting with their neighbors” in the Arabian Gulf.30 
 Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues 
that Dubai’s main challenge in regard to Iran is the historical trade and immigration ties 
that exist between the two regions.  That same security challenge is shared throughout the 
GCC since trade relations with Iran are common in the Arabian Gulf.  This intertwining 
makes it difficult to enforce resolutions like UNSCR 1803 and 1929, which are heavily 
focused on maritime economic activities.  Additionally, many GCC law enforcement 
personnel do not see the reasoning behind sanctioning efforts because they are 
accustomed to maritime trade with Iran for generations.  Sadjadpour further asserts that 
for years more progressive Iranians have moved to Dubai to capitalize on the growing 
Dubai economy.  With this expansion, Dubai has developed a community of businesses 
that are either partially Iranian owned or have a service that is associated with Iran, the 
dominant examples being those in the maritime shipping community.31  This influx of 
Iranian economic activity creates opportunity for what some scholars argues is Iran’s 
growing “influence” in Dubai.32  Dr. Fatma al-Sayegh describes Dubai as being a place 
where not only Persians, but also Indian merchants, have extensively traded with Arabs, 
leading to no observable division based on identity or nationality.  Maritime trade and 
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seafaring united populations to the point where intermarrying occurred between people of 
separate national identities.33 
Middle East scholar Ian Skeet states that in Oman there is a class of merchants 
that live with a dual heritage of being Omani Ajam.  As mentioned in Chapter I of this 
thesis, the Ajam community consists of Arabs that have extensive familial, social, and 
cultural links to Iran.  In Oman these Ajam are even dual citizens, a scenario that is 
common in some GCC countries.  Skeet further asserts that Iranian families have lived 
and assimilated into Omani society for generations.34 Common to many Omani Ajam is a 
history, and current participation in, maritime trade.  According to Dr. Dionisius Agius, 
in the early 1700s Persians attacked Oman, and after conquering Muscat, established 
trade links between Persia, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Red Sea.  Further north on the 
Musandam Peninsula, fishing and transportation networks were established to link Arabia 
with Iran.  In this region, mariners began to speak dialects of Farsi, indicating an 
emphasis on Iranians as trading partners.  19th century traveler reports describe a 
presence of Persian water-wheels in Oman, something that is attributed to Persian control 
of Oman in the 2nd century, as well as in the 1700s.35 
In Sur, Oman the Arab-Iranian trade connections were so strong that in the mid-
1800s Omani dhows spent part of the year moored in ports on the Iranian coast.  Sur also 
became known as a launching port for goods arriving from India and Africa before being 
re-exported to Iran.36  Dr. Beatrice Nicolini explains that many Baluch living in Oman 
transplanted from the Southern Iranian region many generations prior, and are now 
integrated into the Omani culture.”37 This characteristic holds true for other countries in 
the GCC as well.  For example, in Kuwait many Baluch live in the Ahmadi region, which 
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is known for its connection to the port systems.  These Baluchi families have integrated 
into Kuwait society for generations, and many work in Kuwait’s bureaucracy and various 
ministries as full citizens of the country.  In the late 1940s, Dr. Alan Villiers described 
Oman as a country where the individual port held over 100 dhows, many of which would 
travel to the ports of Lingeh and Qishm, Iran, and that ”the flag of Iran” was 
commonplace aboard merchant fleets.38 
Dr. John Duke Anthony states, “Iranians are among the most important in terms 
of their overall impact on the local societies” of Arabian Gulf countries.  Dr. Anthony 
further explains that the Iranians found in the GCC are encompassed in three groups: 
Southern Iranians that have blended for generations into the local population, and have 
developed into the rich merchant class that is found throughout the GCC countries; 
Iranian Baluch, which primarily includes the labor force in some GCC countries; and 
Northern and Central Iranians, which includes merchants that work primarily in import 
and export businesses as manages, port workers, and stevedores.  Anthony further argues 
that the ethnic and trade connections are so strong between the GCC and Iran that the 
Farsi language is routinely used as the language for business transactions and 
negotiations.39  Like elsewhere in the world, the ports, harbors, and inlets of the GCC 
countries are a hybrid of nationalities.  Yet, those maritime centers in the GCC are in a 
difficult position.  Maritime trade between Arab countries and Iran has been present for 
generations, making it a natural activity for many in the GCC.  How then do GCC 
governments and law enforcement agencies make the choice to proactively police 
UNSCR 1803 and 1929 when it contradicts common economic tendencies?  As will be 
shown in the next chapter, those historic trade connections not only influenced the GCC 
maritime economies, but also led to hybrid identities and an influx of guest workers that 
directly impact the enforceability of UNSCR 1803 and 1929 today. 
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III. ARABIAN GULF IDENTITIES  
Intertwined with trade is identity, which also challenges the enforcement of both 
resolutions.  Examples of these obstacles can be found in the Ajam and South Asian 
communities.  Some members of the Ajam community have intentionally not policed 
UNSCR 1803 and 1929 because of their social and ideological connections to Iran; an 
action that does contain specific pro-Iranian intent.  Others within this community have 
created benign trade connections with Iran as part of historic and legitimate shipping 
networks, which does violate both resolutions inadvertently.  Their transactions though, 
are without pro-Iranian intent, and are therefore free of culpability.  The same is true for 
the South Asian immigrants, who arrived to accommodate the need for a workforce to 
complement the GCC’s developing oil industry; however, this need led to unintentional 
obstacles in enforcing both resolutions in the various GCC port systems. 
The identities that comprise the culture of the Arabian Gulf maritime domain are 
diverse.  Dhow crews routinely consist of Iranians, Indians, Pakistanis, Africans, as well 
as Arabs from outside of the Gulf.  Local GCC residents of Arab origin, the Ajam 
community, Westerners, and Indians routinely form the nucleus of the maritime shipping 
industry at the corporate level.  As stated previously, this thesis only focuses its attention 
on the Ajam community at the law enforcement and business levels, and the South Asian 
workforce at the basic enforcement level.  It is impossible to reduce problems in 
enforcing UNSCR 1803 and 1929 to single entities because political events and national 
policies have an influence on policing within a nation as well; however, this thesis only 
focuses its attention on those characteristics that predominately standout as enforcement 
obstacles in the maritime domain. 
A. THE AJAM COMMUNITY 
Dr. Shahnaz Nadjmabadi states that a comprehensive picture of the Ajam 
population in the GCC requires an examination of the Shia sect of Islam in modern GCC 
society, since overwhelmingly the Arab Sunni population views Shi’ism and the Ajam as 
 24 
synonymous.40 It is this link between the Ajam, Shi’ism, and roots in Iran that leads to 
suspicion within GCC law enforcement about some members of the Ajam populace and 
their loyalty.  Furthermore, it is the purposeful illegal acts of some members of the Ajam 
population that exaggerates those suspicions.  For example, in 2010, the U.S. Department 
of Justice brought charges against Mahmoud Reza Banki, a naturalized U.S. citizen, for 
making illegal money transfers to Iran via an informal network outside normal banking.  
Reportedly, for three years Banki used the hawala system, which is common in the 
Middle East, to collect funds in one country and subsequently disperse the values of those 
funds in Iran.  One piece common to the hawala system is the concept that money never 
physically transfers over borders; it is simply dispersed based on the amount given in 
another country.  According to reports, Banki solicited money from residents of Kuwait, 
as well as other Gulf countries, for distribution to undisclosed assets in Iran.41  Several 
Ajam residing in the United States and the GCC were identified as being co-conspirators 
in Banki’s illegal activity.42 
Dr. Nadjmabadi further argues that a complete understanding of Iran today cannot 
be fully accomplished without understanding Iran’s strong social relationship to the GCC 
countries, thereby stressing the influence of this link between religion, ethnic population, 
and Iran, 43 The same argument can be made about the GCC’s history; it cannot be fully 
understood without examining those GCC citizens that have a strong social and cultural 
bond to Iran.  As many Ajam and Arab citizens emphasize today, the GCC countries are a 
window for Iran to the rest of the world because of their intertwined history, and many 
residents in the GCC fully accept this characteristic as part of their known past. 
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 Much of the GCC’s Ajam population left Iran within the past 200 years.  Some of 
those families who arrived brought with them their skill-set in maritime trade, something 
that is still prevalent in the present Ajam generation.44 Regardless of the reason for 
immigration, what developed from this initial arrival was a class of people in the GCC 
that have both a religious tie through Shi’ism, as well as an economic connection to Iran 
through business transactions.  Yet, the interconnectedness between Iran and the GCC 
created the foundation for the security challenges that exist in the Arabian Gulf maritime 
domain today.  One of those families that arrived during these times of Iranian to Arab 
migration, and is still prominent today, is the al-Ma’rafis of Kuwait.  Like many from 
Iran, the al-Ma’rafis came to Kuwait to capitalize on economic opportunities that were 
non-existent in Iran.45  
Other influential Ajam families present in Kuwait today, like the Ashkanani, 
Dashti, and Bahbahani, came to Kuwait for similar economic reasons, while other 
families fled Iran after unfavorable agriculture conditions hit the Persian lands.46 It is 
reported that a great drought hit Iran, which forced many Iranians to the GCC in order to 
find opportunities in the growing business and trade sectors of their economies.47  As 
time progressed other Iranians came to the GCC in order to escape crippling government 
regulations on trade that the Pahlavi dynasty established, allowing many new arrivals to 
find employment in the blossoming oil production industry of the GCC countries, as well 
as in the developing national bureaucracy.48  Regardless of the specific employment 
field, through subsequent generations those newly arrived Iranian families began to 
absorb into their new Arab societies, finding permanent positions in the police, military, 
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and as leaders of multi-national corporations involved in maritime trade.  According to 
Arabian Gulf historian J.E. Peterson, in Oman the Ajam have come to marry citizens with 
Arab identities taking “Arab names” for their family.49 
Using Kuwait as an example, some scholars argue that historically Kuwait was a 
center for Persian immigration because its location in the Northern Arabian Gulf made 
the nation a hub for trade and fishing.50  Today, that historic influence is still present as 
Kuwait runs a complex maritime system that consists of three major trading ports, all of 
which are heavily involved with Iranian imports and exports.  As previously mentioned 
one of those newly arrived Iranian Ajam families that established roots in Kuwait’s port 
system is the Dashti family who are heavily involved in shipping between Kuwait and 
Iran.  Their family business KGL is highly successful in this arena; however, that success 
came at the expense of UNSCR 1803 and 1929 because of their joint business venture 
with a sanctioned Iranian shipping company that these resolutions targeted.51  
Middle East scholars Graham Fuller and Rend Francke advise that the Ajam in 
Kuwait are routinely a part of the corporations that are involved in international trade 
with Iran, and describe those business relationships as being strong.52 It is these large-
scale maritime trade corporations that exist as a bridge between Iran and Kuwait that 
present a major challenge for enforcement agencies who are trying to limit Iranian 
activity.  For example, national security analyst Anthony Cordesman states that the 
Kuwaiti government has made it their foreign policy platform to work with the Iranian 
government as opposed to confrontation, as well as attempted to increase imports and 
exports between the two countries.  Reports indicate that in the early 1990s Kuwait 
imported a large amount of products from Iran, and the amount has only increased since 
then.  In 2004, the number of exports to Iran reached 4.5 million Kuwaiti Dinar, and the 
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number of imports reached as high as 35.3 million Dinar, placing Iran as Kuwait’s 
number seven trading partner worldwide.53 
 Adding to the challenge of economic ties, it is reported that from 1965 to 1970 
the number of Iranian citizens that moved to Kuwait increased from approximately 
31,000 to 39,000 as a result of Kuwait’s modernization from oil revenue; however, this 
rise in foreign population created a scenario that some Middle East scholars describe as 
being “dangerous” for overall security.54 Regardless of the reason for their departure 
from Iran, the Ajam in Kuwait have maintained a cultural hold on their former homeland.  
Dr. Laurence Louer argues that for some, the personal Ajam identity is heavily reliant on 
this link to Iran, to the point that their spiritual Shia guidance is also centered in the 
teachings of Iranian religious leaders.   With this connection, some Ajam make specific 
choices to ensure that their Iranian link is never severed.  For example, some marry 
Persians who physically live in Iran, others maintain seasonal homes in Iran, and several 
escape to Iran during times of crisis in an Arab Gulf country, while some make Farsi the 
language of the household.55  A Kuwaiti news publication depicts the commonality of 
this travel best in a recent article in which it reports that in 2011, approximately 45,000 
Kuwaitis traveled to different parts of Iran, which is an “indication of deep-rooted 
brotherly ties between the two countries.”56 As the research in this thesis shows, that 
travel creates another challenge for those in Kuwait’s security services in maintaining the 
domestic stability of their nation, as well as directly creates vulnerabilities in protecting 
US assets and interests in the Arabian Gulf. 
 As stated previously, one result of Ajam families in the GCC maintaining a grip 
on their Iranian past is contact with relatives living on the Persian side of the Arabian 
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Gulf.  Dr. Shahnaz Nadjmabadi uses the example of one Arab family residing for several 
generations in Iran, and during a tumultuous period following the Islamic revolution in 
1979, some of the family members returned to the Arab side of the Gulf, while others 
stayed in Iran, married into Persian families, and converted to Shi’ism.57 Dr. William 
Beeman describes this phenomenon as a “Khaliji” or “Gulf Community” that has 
cemented the Arab and Persian sides of the Gulf through generations of experience; 
creating an identity that supersedes individual nationalities.  This idea is fully evident 
when one hears “Khaliji” dialect of Arabic being spoken with a blend of Farsi; something 
that developed over years of maritime trade between the two regions facilitated through 
traditional dhow travel.58   
Dr. Beeman provides further evidence of this cross border family linkage with the 
example of the Iranian Karmati family that through marriage extended their lineage 
directly to Bahrain.  Another example Dr. Beeman offers is the Khamadi family from 
Iran, which has one brother working in Dubai, one in Oman, one in Kuwait working in 
the oil industry, and one living in Iran as a maritime trader with Dubai. It is family 
networks like the aforementioned that make enforcing security resolutions involving Iran 
extremely difficult, and therefore, increasing the level of suspicion among Sunni 
government authorities about where national loyalty is centered.  How do state security 
services convince family members to support UN decisions over potential financial gains 
through family trade?  Obviously, this concern is not centered on the entire Ajam 
population as a whole; however, there are members of the Ajam community where this 
suspicion is warranted.  Dr. Beeman provides insight into the potential obstacles and 
challenges with his statement, “the strength of the economy and social fabric of the 
region depends on this freedom of interchange” between Iran and the Arabian 
countries.59   
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 If being of Iranian heritage is one part of the Ajam identity, the other part of 
Shi’ism creates its own set of challenges.  Some scholars argue that in GCC countries 
where power and influence is in the hands of those that follow the Sunni sect, absorbing 
into GCC society is difficult for the Shia.60  Of course the level of non-integration varies 
from each GCC country to the next, as well as from each family to the next.  For 
example, in Bahrain Shia integration into the state system is difficult; however, in Kuwait 
it is common to see an Ajami Shia working as a business executive or as a member of the 
Kuwait military. It is further asserted that in order to bring the Shia into society’s fold, 
Sunni led governments need to embark on a path of making their nation equal to both 
sects. The problem that develops is the potential for Iranian influence to spread if Sunni 
governments continue to marginalize the Shia populations.  To counter the 
marginalization that is created, Drs. Fuller and Francke argue that the Shia population 
needs to have the same opportunities and representation as that of the Sunni population.61 
The problem with this argument is that it requires Gulf security services to overcome the 
suspicion that is created when an Ajam member of the population violates the law in 
favor of Iranian entities, something that has occurred in the GCC to the detriment of the 
internal security.  For example, according to a U.S. Congressional Research Service 
report several members of a GCC military were arrested for conspiring to sabotage Arab 
industrial and energy complexes.62   
 Furthermore, Drs. Fuller and Francke assert that when some members of the Shia 
population embark on a path of voicing their frustrations of inequality vis-à-vis the Sunni 
population, the nation’s security services assume that they are acting as a domestic 
destabilizing force.63  Using Kuwait again as an example, those accusations and 
suspicions originate from travesties that occurred in Kuwait during the Iran-Iraq war 
when Kuwait was exposed to several Iranian influenced terrorist attacks because of 
Kuwait’s support to Iraq.  It is because of these suspicions that some scholars believe that 
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Shia do not rise to senior ranks in the military or security forces and are prohibited from 
sensitive positions; however, in Kuwait, this is not the case.64   The threat is compounded 
when added with what Drs. Fuller and Francke assert is the Iranian government’s 
continual involvement with Shia populations outside of Iran, increased domestic political 
involvement among Shia young because of feeling disassociated with society, as well as 
what Dr. Matthew Levitt states is Iran’s intelligence service continual use of “clandestine 
assets abroad.”65 
 Dr. Jill Crystal states that in the mid-1970s, approximately 30 thousand Iranians 
had resettled in Kuwait.  As the Iranian regime under the Shah of Iran toppled, bringing 
in the era of Ayatollah Khomeini, many of those Iranians living in GCC countries began 
to openly display their support for the new regime.  These new Ajam became politically 
involved in the events of Iran, something that is seen today in the GCC countries as many 
Ajam are active in the politics of Iran through voting in their elections.  To lower the risk 
posed by some of this new population, GCC governments began to prevent some Shia 
from not filling certain government positions that were considered “sensitive”.  This 
policy decision was emphasized even more when, as Dr. Crystal explains, several 
suspects in a 1980s attack on Kuwait’s oil industrial area were identified as being from 
the aforementioned Ajami Dashti family.66 Over time though, the removal of Shia from 
“sensitive” positions diminished, as seen in recent years with the assigning of Shia to 
positions in the military and law enforcement of some GCC countries.  
As shown, the current presence of the Ajam community in the GCC owes its roots 
to Arabian Gulf history; however, that presence has created specific vulnerabilities in 
enforcing UNSCR 1803 and 1929.  One area where the Ajam identity has presented 
enforcement challenges is within the ranks of those law enforcement agencies whose task 
centers on limiting Iranian influence in the maritime domain.  GCC security services 
maintain a diverse enforcement mission that covers everything from drug smuggling, 
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general crimes, internal stability, and national defense.  Depending on the specific task, 
either the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Defense will be the primary enforcement 
arm.  For example, stopping drug smuggling from Iran via maritime means would be the 
responsibility of either the Coast Guard or the Customs Division; both directorates that 
fall under the Ministry of Interior.  Stopping the incursion of Iranian naval boats into 
disputed oil territory in the Arabian Gulf would be the responsibility of the Naval Force, 
a division of the Ministry of Defense.  In regard to policing Iranian sanctions, the 
Customs Division is responsible for inspecting general cargo that is being imported into, 
or exported out of the GCC.  Additionally, the Customs Division routinely assists the 
Coast Guard in preventing and investigating the trafficking of illegal drugs into the GCC; 
however, the Coast Guard has an additional task of stopping illegal immigration of Iraqis 
and Iranians.  Depending on the specific country, members of the Ajam population can be 
found in various jobs and ranks of all these departments. 
Within the various ports of the GCC, the Customs Division has the responsibility 
of inspecting maritime cargo, meaning that this division would be the last enforcement 
authority to examine containers, equipment, or other products being loaded in the GCC 
for delivery to Iran.  The problem that has developed within GCC countries is some Ajam 
employees within the Customs Division hold the opinion that the cargo being loaded for 
Iran does not need to be inspected with any more scrutiny than cargo going to any other 
country.  This means that when Iranian cargo enters the port, it is simply ignored.  These 
Ajam maintain these views because in their opinion Iran is not seen as a threat, they have 
family lineage that directly correlates to Iran, or because of their religious preference of 
following Shi’ism; meaning that their Ajam identity outweighed their dedication to 
enforcing and supporting UNSCR 1803 and 1929.  This dedication to their Iranian 
lineage inadvertently collides with their Sunni counterparts, who make the decision to 
ignore the Ajam activity because they do not want to develop a fitna, or strong division, 
within the workplace.  What does this phenomenon result in?  A vessel taking on cargo in 
a GCC port for subsequent transport to Iran can depart without any law enforcement 
authority inspection, thereby weakening the effectiveness of both resolutions. 
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Based on the incidents mentioned above, it is difficult to argue against identity 
playing a role in enforcing UNSCR 1803 and 1929.  The Customs Division examples 
provided clearly show that to some people, their Ajam identity led to a specific intent to 
not proactively police either resolution, which ultimately led to the goals of both 
resolutions being thwarted.  Logically not all Ajam members in the Customs Division, or 
other section of the Ministry of Interior for that matter, place dedication to duty as a 
secondary priority, but when some members do actively ignore these resolutions, it 
results in significant obstacles in these resolutions being effective.  For the policy maker, 
scholar, or analyst, this challenge is important because it sheds light on vulnerabilities 
that can make these resolutions futile, thereby affording governments the opportunity to 
establish possible alternatives.  U.N. resolutions do not enforce themselves, and the U.N. 
is not going to send a force to each individual country to ensure UNSCR 1803 and 1929 
are being followed.  The security services of the individual nation are the bulwark against 
these resolutions failing, and if some members of a host nation police force are not 
interested in these resolutions because they stand opposite to an individual’s identity, 
then these resolutions are not going to work as an effective strategy. 
B. THE SOUTH ASIAN COMMUNITY 
According to Dr. Patricia Risso, South Asian immigrants were found in the GCC 
countries as far back as the 16th century in order to support the maritime trade that 
existed with India.  Primarily, this relatively small group of people focused their efforts in 
“import and export, commercial agents, and bankers,” characteristics that existed well 
into the 19th century.  Dr. Risso further states that this focus on “elite” traders ignores 
“ordinary and often poor people,” which make up most of the manual labor workforce in 
the GCC today.67  Overtime this workforce has expanded to include all of the countries 
in South Asia.  It is commonplace today to see members of this immigrant workforce 
employed as low-wage supplements to the various GCC Customs Divisions’ cargo 
inspection regimes, which as will be shown, has led to scenarios where UNSCR 1803 and 
1929 are not enforced on a daily basis. 
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After World War II, the GCC’s oil industry grew rapidly to keep pace with the 
increasing need of developed nations.  It was the discovery of oil in the first place that 
transformed the GCC countries from international trading areas that thrived on the 
Arabian Gulf’s richness in pearls, to an economic hub for the world’s oil market.  During 
this time came one of the quickest growth rates of national and personal wealth ever 
recorded, which directly led to a quality of life and standard of living that was equally 
luxurious.  Also with this growth came the need for buildings, oil refineries, and deep-
water ports to transport oil to foreign shores, as well as the need for people to do the 
construction and subsequent workload.68 
The workforce of the GCC countries is a financial lifeline for those in 
underdeveloped countries that are looking for monetary opportunities that are absent in 
their native homelands.  In the GCC this diaspora consists of workers from the 
Philippines, Egypt, and the Horn of Africa, but it is immigrants from South Asia 
(Pakistan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh) that are predominant.  The majority 
of positions these nationalities hold center on manual labor and domestic work, which is 
organized under the Kefala system; a system which has been criticized for its reputation 
as forcing people to find secondary employment to accommodate low income.  For 
example, as Dr. Pardis Mahdavi states, in Dubai it is understood that many female South 
Asian workers find additional work in prostitution as a way to pay back their debts 
incurred under the Kefala system because their domestic job does not pay enough.  In the 
GCC, that additional income sometimes comes from the criminal underworld through 
participation in the illegal drug trafficking sector.69 
           When operated morally, the Kefala system is a useful tool for immigrant workers 
that are looking for employment in the GCC countries; however, the program is 
susceptible to those people that make the decision to operate outside of the law.  Many 
incidents have occurred where groups of people will run the system in a manner that 
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exploits money from the South Asian workers through raising costs of necessary 
paperwork to an exorbitant price that must be paid back.  Leverage is used as these 
migrants sometimes have their passports seized in order for compliance.  Arriving job 
seekers usually take the path of a local sponsor in order to obtain the necessary 
documents to enter the country.  The Kefala agent subsequently purchases the documents, 
and then the papers are ultimately sold to an incoming worker.  Another path involves the 
migrant entering the country on a tourist visa, finding a local GCC sponsor through 
associates, and then paying the sponsor directly for the needed documents.  Even though 
wages vary, a South Asian worker paying back the almost two thousand dollars in 
expenditures can take some time, and when a passport is being withheld, comes the need 
to make money through any means possible.70 
The employment opportunities available in the GCC have a tendency to be biased 
based on a candidate’s citizenship and identity.  Government and high-level jobs in the 
business community are normally reserved for GCC citizens; however, citizens from 
Western and some Asian countries, as well as some countries of the Levant, find 
positions in this sector because of specific skill or education.  South Asians tend to find 
employment in construction, oil fields, and loading and unloading ships.  It is reported 
that approximately 80% of the workforce in the GCC countries is a foreign worker, and 
that the local economy succeeds because of this group.71 
According to Dr. John Duke Anthony, many Indians find work in “white collar” 
positions, some of which include shipping agents in the various GCC ports.72 This puts 
them in a significant position when it comes to supporting UNSCR 1803 and 1929.  
Based on the text of both resolutions, shipping agents play a role in ensuring that 
sanctioned material is not loaded aboard vessels transiting to Iran.  If these agents are not 
educated on either resolution simply because it is irrelevant to the Arabian Gulf’s 
maritime economy, then logically both resolutions are deemed ineffective.  Furthermore, 
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Dr. Anthony states that the majority of unskilled laborers in the GCC are Pakistanis and 
Indians from the lowers classes.  These immigrants routinely find work as manual 
laborers, stevedore, etc. in the various ports and receive low wages.73 Again, based on the 
sections of both resolutions, a stevedore does play a supporting role; however, this is 
incumbent on GCC law enforcement establishing a community policing relationship to 
educate that stevedore on how they can assist in enforcement.  Going back to the Ajam, if 
you have GCC Customs inspectors that do not want to proactively enforce UNSCR 1803 
and 1929 for identity reasons, then how can the international community rely on them to 
work with a Pakistani stevedore in ensuring Iran does not receive sanctioned material.  It 
simply will not happen, and these resolutions will continue to be unenforced.  In the mid-
1980s, estimates put the number of South Asians in the GCC at over 40%.74  With 
immigration continuing because many GCC cities have greatly expanded since the 1980s, 
the South Asian workforce has been able to find more opportunities in the maritime 
environment.  Based on these amounts, the creation of opportunities where enforcing 
UNSCR 1803 and 1929 can be missed has increased alongside. 
The GCC foreign workforce has grown rapidly to match the need of the local 
population, at times reaching a level of over 120%.  It is reported that this mass influx led 
to the importation of new crime into the country, and gave birth to the roots of the 
modern day smuggling networks.  In regard to illegal smuggling cases undertaken by 
GCC law enforcement, historically there have been times where the number of 
investigations grew at a rate of over 100% in a five-year period with blame being placed 
on the immigrant workforce; South Asian being a significant member of.  As a result of 
this influx a concern grew among GCC citizens on how to protect their traditional culture 
that was under attack from foreign criminal interests, a concept that was similar to post-
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Gulf War I fears wherein it is believed that the exposure of Kuwaiti citizens to more 
Western influences directly led to some people opening up to criminal activity.75 
According to Dr. Myron Walker, estimates in the early 1980s put the amount of 
remittances from Indian workers in the GCC at well over a billion USD.  The majority 
returned to Kerala, India where it assisted in easing rampant unemployment.  Remittances 
also returned to Karnataka, Goa, Maharashtra, and Gujarat in India.  GCC attempts to 
limit Indian migration out of fear of overpopulation, led to backlash from the Indian 
government.  Like other nationalities, many of the arriving unskilled labor found work in 
construction; some even in dry-docks for vessel building and repair.  Others found work 
in mid to high level trading jobs in the shipping industry76 
In regard to the South Asian workforce in GCC law enforcement, some GCC 
Customs Division offices have workers from Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, etc., 
performing the actual searches of maritime cargo because the local personnel delegate the 
work.  In these arrangements, a South Asian routinely supervises the searches alongside a 
Customs officer.  The problem though, is these workers are only advised to search for 
alcohol, narcotics, or people.  They are not trained Customs or other Ministry of Interior 
personnel, not trained in advanced search techniques, and are paid extremely low wages.  
Most importantly, they are not trained in searching for machinery that could be dual-use, 
and therefore having the potential to be used in either Iran’s nuclear program or military 
forces.  With GCC ports being a middle point for cargo to Iran, a container could arrive 
from a European or Asian port and never be thoroughly inspected by any law 
enforcement entity before going to its final destination.   Furthermore, for no fault of their 
own, these workers do not understand the legal authority they possess when dealing with 
a foreign flagged vessel that arrives in a GCC port.   Based on international maritime 
law’s twelve nautical mile standard, GCC countries can set necessary enforcement 
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guidelines for vessels entering their harbors.  With UNSCR 1803 and 1929 there is 
enough probable cause for law enforcement entities to act proactively towards Iranian 
vessels, therefore allowing the South Asian Customs Division workforce to operate more 
aggressively towards Iranian cargo. 
Similar to understanding the role of the Ajam in Iranian sanctions, understanding 
the impact the South Asian community has on enforcement is equally important.  For 
those people charged with understanding UNSCR 1803 and 1929 in the maritime 
domain, the implications of identifying another vulnerability in the enforcement of these 
resolutions cannot be measured.   Not only then do these resolutions get weakened from 
the specific actions of some Ajam, they are now deemed ineffective because of the use of 
an immigrant community that should probably not be inspecting cargo in the first place.  
For the GCC, this is an opportunity for policy changes.  Increase the size of the Customs 
Division to have more workers from that country, or introduce a policy that makes this 
South Asian immigrant workforce a fully trained and sworn arm of the law enforcement 
community.  As will be shown in the next chapter, not only does national identity assist 
in limiting the enforceability of both resolutions, the success of each has also been 
undermined because of the international maritime smuggling networks that grew out of 
immigration, the movement of people, and the trade industry that bridged the Arab world 
to the Persian, South Asian, and African regions. 
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IV. MARITIME SMUGGLING NETWORKS 
 This chapter examines the development of Arabian Gulf smuggling networks, 
and their overall impact on enforcing UNSCR 1803 and 1929.  The historic trade the 
GCC countries had with the outside world, both the Persian as well as surrounding areas 
of India and Africa, formed the foundations for maritime criminal activity.  Immigration 
from those regions, combined with Arab facilitation, provided the means to further these 
networks.  As will be shown in the chapter, these smuggling networks make enforcing 
both resolutions a challenged endeavor.  Not only is it possible for illicit cargo to be 
transported to Iran via these maritime networks, and therefore without law enforcement 
scrutiny, it can also introduce the intertwining of criminal organizations and the Iranian 
weapons procurers as partners. 
Emphasizing the influence of illegal drug importation, a recent Arab media report 
on Kuwait asserts that there are approximately five thousand illegal drug users in Kuwait, 
and on average, four drug related arrests per day.  Furthermore, there has been an overall 
increase in the amount of deaths and hospitalizations from overdoses.  As shown in the 
same media report, Kuwait’s illegal drug trade has become a combination of a transit 
point and destination point for importation.77  Kuwait is not known for its ability to 
produce illegal drugs.  The majority of drugs found in the region originate in 
Afghanistan.  Focusing strictly on the maritime domain, criminal groups transport opiates 
and hashish from Iranian coastlines, as well as from outside the Arabian Gulf in India and 
Pakistan in order to fulfill local demand.  The same is true for the rest of the GCC 
countries; however, this demand creates means of transport that procurers of illicit 
material can easily exploit. 
A. OVERVIEW OF ARABIAN GULF SMUGGLING NETWORKS   
Maritime trafficking is one of the routinely used modes of transporting illegal 
drugs into the Arabian Gulf, and South Asian narcotics and hashish are the products of 
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choice.  This seafaring enterprise is not a new phenomenon, maritime smuggling 
networks operated for years assisting Saddam Hussein’s regime overcome international 
sanctions in the 1990s.  Similar scenarios exist in the Mediterranean Sea.  Narcotics 
traffickers have used the water to transport large amounts of hashish to countries in 
Western Europe.   According to international trafficking scholar, Pierre Arnaud Chouvy, 
these Moroccan networks have become so significant that they now transport other illicit 
cargo.  Two of the most routinely used smuggling modes in this region are “fishing 
vessels and private yachts,” as well as “Zodiac speedboats.”78  Similar tactics are used 
throughout the Arabian Gulf in order to transport narcotics into the Middle East region 
from South Asia. 
Pierre Chouvy states that the Arab origin of trading in drugs can be traced back to 
caravans in the 7th century transporting poppy plants to South Asia, specifically India.  
Between the 14th and 19th centuries, opium trading fell into the hands of the Venetians, 
Portuguese, Dutch, and British with the East India Company.79  Undoubtedly, through 
British maritime activity, drugs reached the Arabian Gulf because of their extensive 
presence in Dubai as a regional trading center.  The same is true with the Portuguese, 
whose vessels traveled throughout the Arabian Gulf, specifically Oman. 
Dr. Ryan Gingeras asserts that historically opium use in the Middle East can be 
traced to “several millennia.” For Iran and Afghanistan, their significance as an opiate 
producer emerged after the 16th century.  In the 19th century, usage and demand of 
opiate derived drugs grew throughout the world.  In the 20th century Iranian addiction to 
both local and Turkish opiates reached dire proportions.  As restrictions in Iran grew 
because of Western influence, Afghan smuggling across borders increased as global 
demand continued.80 Dr. Hermann Kruetzmann asserts that between 1994 and 2000, 
Afghan opiate production reached 21,337 tons, or over 62% of global production.  
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Additionally, Pakistan reached 7th place with 331 tons, or 1 % of global production.   
During this period, markets for South Asian opiates were found in Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman; areas reached via maritime networks 
launched from Iran and Pakistan.81 
According to U.N. assertions, Afghan opiates “threaten the health and well-being 
of people in many regions of the world.”  Some of those opiates do find their way into the 
GCC’s illegal drug market.  The United Nations argues that the Afghan drug trade has a 
direct negative impact on the “governance, security, stability, and development in 
Afghanistan, in its neighbors, and in the broader region and beyond.”  This is also true in 
the GCC where opium and heroin has impacted not only GCC youth, but also portions of 
the GCC security services and foreign workforce.  Like elsewhere in the world, the lure 
of illegal drug trafficking is found in the large profits that can be earned, profits that 
could be used to fund everything from criminal networks to various insurgencies.  
Specifically with Afghan opiates, the United Nations estimates that approximately 61 
Billion USD is generated each year because of the global demand for heroin and opium 
derived products.82  
Drs. Nigel Inkster and Virginia Comolli state that Afghan opiates reached 
approximately 48% of Afghanistan’s Gross Domestic Product in 2007, and has become a 
source of power to many influential people in the country.  Primarily, Afghan opiates 
find their way into European markets, where it is estimated that users intake 
approximately 88 metric tons per year.  Reportedly, smugglers use a combination of large 
bulk shipments, as well as individual packages along three primary routes: Northern 
Route through Central Asia, Balkan Route through Iran and Turkey, and the Southern 
Route through Pakistan, Baluchistan, and the Makran Coast.83 Organized crime scholar 
Howard Abadinsky makes reference to this region as The Golden Crescent because of it 
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being rich in limestone and the proper climate, therefore making it an ideal region for the 
production of opiates.84 
Current U.N. analysis asserts that Afghan opiates are smuggled into Iran, 
Pakistan, and Central Asia where they are then trafficked to various parts of the world. 
Some of the trafficked drugs from Afghanistan are funneled off to meet the increasing 
domestic demand in the Arabian Gulf countries.  U.N. reporting states that one of the 
primary challenges to limiting the spread of Afghan opium to the Gulf is the lack of 
attention and focus on law enforcement operations in the maritime domain.  As an 
example, globally in 2009 approximately 4000 cargo containers were shipped throughout 
the world, 2% of which law enforcement were able to inspect.85  Not only then is it 
possible for Narco-traffickers to use legitimate shipping networks, but procurers of illicit 
material sanctioned under UNSCR 1803 and 1929 can also capitalize on this void in 
policing.  If law enforcement is unable to examine all maritime cargo, dangerous cargo 
can simply be transported via maritime trade. 
The United Nations explains that portions of the opiates smuggled via the Central 
Asia Route through Iran are redirected to the Arab Peninsula, as well as those drugs 
smuggled through the Pakistani Southern Route to the Arab Peninsula.  Estimates 
indicate that in 2009, 115 tons of Afghan heroin and 1050 tons of opium were smuggled 
into Iran through Southern Afghanistan’s Nimroz, Farah, and Hirat Provinces.  Smaller 
amounts were then trafficked over the Arabian Gulf to the GCC.86  Many of these drugs 
reach Arab lands via the indigenous dhow fleet, as well as through the large container 
vessels that exist solely for Iranian, GCC, and Indian ports.   Some criminal networks 
traffic drugs into the GCC via personal boats that coordinate their movement based on a 
person residing in the GCC who is partnered with a person residing in Iran or Pakistan.  
Recent U.N. reports argue that Iranian drug groups are starting to produce 
methamphetamines on a large scale in order to earn money from the illegal drug markets 
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of neighboring countries.87 Like Afghan opiates, one of the ways this trade reaches the 
GCC is via maritime smuggling networks. 
According to Arabian Gulf security centers, illegal drugs entering the GCC are 
imported via several established networks.  One of the primary routes for smuggling 
Afghan opiates and hashish is the Southern Route through Pakistan.  Through this route 
drugs are funneled off and transported to the Bandar Abbas Port for transport to the UAE 
and Qatar.  Illegal drugs on the Southern Route are funneled off in the Iranian city of 
Yazd for delivery to Iraq, where they are ultimately smuggled to Kuwait.  In addition, 
Afghan opiates and hashish are smuggled along the Hormozyan Route via Chabahar, 
Bandar Abbas, and ultimately to the UAE and Qatar.  Drugs trafficked along both of 
these routes are ultimately delivered to criminal networks in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and 
Kuwait through maritime routes stemming from Iran’s long coastline.  What is changing 
though is that GCC countries were historically known as being transit points for Europe, 
but now the GCC is being labeled a “hub” for opiate and hashish use, as opposed to only 
being a transit point.  According to the Gulf Research Center, GCC citizens are reported 
as being the main group of abusers, with many causes centering on unemployment, 
excess of money, boredom, and overall frustration.88    
Another vulnerability in the GCC is the northern border with Iraq.  Not only does 
contraband get smuggled through land routes, but also through the waters near Kuwait’s 
Bubiyan Island.  The transportation industry, much of which transits through the GCC 
ports, facilitates trade between Iraq and the GCC countries.  Criminal groups routinely 
exploit this legitimate network of shipping and transportation for trafficking illegal drugs, 
and if drugs can be easily trafficked, so too can illicit material.  Being Kuwait’s neighbor, 
combined with internal instability, Iraq drug activity has directly impacted the GCC.  
Indications reveal that drug abuse within Iraq will continue to rise; similar fears are felt 
throughout the Gulf countries as well.  In Iraq one of the main problems is that the 
country is considered a waypoint for drugs being trafficked from Iran to the GCC.  One 
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of the other drugs coming from Iraq’s borders is Captagon, a stimulant substance that is 
illegal, but is making is making headway in the GCC.  Other drugs making their way 
through Iraq are cocaine, heroin, hashish, and methamphetamines; some even being 
delivered as far south as Saudi Arabian’s southern border.  Some experts argue that 
shipments from Iraq heading to Saudi Arabia will cause spillover throughout the GCC; 
undoubtedly this is happening.89  
B. SOUTH ASIAN INFLUENCE 
South Asian traffickers are a significant problem when it comes to drug 
importation into the GCC, something that stems from countries like Pakistan being a 
transit point for Afghan opiates and hashish.  As shown, South Asian influence stems 
from the historic trade and immigration that has permeated the Arabian Gulf.  The opiate 
derived distribution network they operate crosses the borders of multiple GCC countries, 
and uses maritime networks as one of its mode of transport.  One of the most notorious 
South Asian incidents involves a Pakistani male that is currently incarcerated in Kuwait’s 
central jail who has operated a network that is very complex, making it difficult for law 
enforcement to disrupt it.  For example, in October 2012 an Iraqi national was arrested 
for trafficking drugs into Kuwait through a border crossing.  During the investigation it 
was revealed that a Pakistani inmate, who controls most of the opiate importation, 
coordinated the shipment.  In February 2013, a Pakistani man was arrested in Kuwait for 
possessing heroin, which he was dealing to the local community for a Pakistani “inmate 
who is serving a life term for trafficking in drugs.”90   
Pakistan is a launching point for drugs coming out of Afghanistan, as well as 
locally grown, in order to reach markets worldwide.  In regard to the GCC countries, 
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Pakistani smugglers use legitimate cargo vessels, airlines, and dhow trading fleets to 
transport their product.  Any legitimate path a South Asian worker uses to come to the 
GCC can be used for the transportation of illegal drugs, as well as sanctioned illicit cargo.  
One of the most creative ways in the GCC involved a shipment of rugs that smugglers 
wove drugs into the threads of the carpets for removal at a later time.  This seizure was a 
significant success for GCC law enforcement, and is celebrated to this day.91  In other 
examples, GCC operations led to the arrest of a Pakistani driver of a GCC family for 
possessing heroin that was divided into packets for sale into the local market.  Another 
GCC investigation led to the arrest of a Pakistani and Bangladeshi male, who were being 
assisted by a GCC national, for dealing approximately four kilograms of heroin.  The part 
of town they were arrested in is known as an immigrant workforce community that has 
problems with various types of contraband.  During the interrogations the suspects 
advised that they received the drug shipments from truck drivers that cross over the Iraqi 
borders for trade, as well as from maritime trafficking. 
C. IRANIAN INFLUENCE 
Iranian smuggling has been a major problem for GCC law enforcement, 
specifically for the Coast Guard services that attempt to interdict Iranian maritime 
activity.  It is commonplace to have personal vessels transit the Arabian Gulf with the 
specific intent on trafficking hashish and heroin into the GCC.  Commonly, these 
smuggling networks are usually a combination of an Ajam that has relatives in Iran, or 
Iranians themselves with a distribution connection in the GCC.  In other occasions it is a 
GCC citizen that has somehow been inspired to take the role of trafficker.  In addition, 
the Iranian dhow fishing fleet that transits back and forth from the GCC’s northern 
borders to various ports in Iran has had several incidents of hashish and heroin 
clandestinely stored within the vessel for distribution in the GCC market. Within this 
network it is logical that UNSCR 1803 and 1929 illicit material could follow this same 
path for smuggling, 
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Throughout history, Iran’s mountain region has been a part of the Golden 
Crescent, which links smuggling routes to Pakistan and Afghanistan.  As an estimate 
Afghanistan cultivates approximately 3,500 tons of opium per year, and much of it finds 
its way into the Iranian market for transit into the GCC.  Because of Iran’s large coastline 
that extends along the majority of the Arabian Gulf, Afghani opium has many areas of 
un-policed seashores and inlets where traffickers can launch for transit into the GCC.  
The returning trips could be used for transporting sanctioned material.  Not only does 
Iran act as a transit point for drugs coming out of Pakistan and Afghanistan, it also suffers 
from its own problem of opium and cannabis cultivation; cannabis being the plant in 
which hashish is derived from.  Routinely, hashish from Iran is seized in the GCC.92 
An example of an Iranian criminal group that was complicit in furthering 
narcotics distribution from Afghanistan and Pakistan is the Rikabadi Organization.  
According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, an Iranian national named 
Hussein Karimi headed this organization.  Based on evidence presented during the 
investigation, Karimi trafficked narcotics through Iran and Turkey to the markets in 
Western Europe and the United States from his headquarters in Romania.93  
Illegal drugs enter the GCC countries through various means, and through the 
hands of multiple national identities; however, the success of traffickers getting product 
to the GCC market opens up venues for routes that could be used for transporting 
material sanctioned under UNSCR 1803 and 1929.  The smuggling market from the GCC 
to Iran is widely known.  What is to stop a drug trafficker from transporting illicit 
material back to Iran after delivering a shipment of heroin or hashish?  The same holds 
true for a drug trafficker delivering contraband from Pakistan.  The supply system for 
sanctioned Iranian material could begin with a nuclear technology supplier in South Asia 
loading cargo on a drug trafficking dhow that is going to the GCC.  The offloaded cargo 
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can then be loaded onto a drug trafficking speedboat traveling back to Iran after 
delivering drugs in the GCC.  This scenario is logical, and even though there have not 
been any reported incidents using dhows, only large cargo vessels, the following section 
explains how a marriage of criminal networks and proliferators is logical in the Arabian 
Gulf maritime domain. 
D. THE USE OF CRIMINAL NETWORKS FOR PROLIFERATION 
Dr. Sheena Chestnut in an article on North Korea proliferation asserts that there 
are links between criminal smuggling and trafficking in sanctioned material.  Dr. 
Chestnut states that the North Korean regime has routinely smuggled currency through 
the U.S port system.  Furthermore she argues that the North Korean government is using 
criminal networks that are intertwined with trading companies for obtaining sanctioned 
material.  As an example, she uses a North Korean company in Japan that shipped 
weaponry in violation of international sanctions.94 According to Dr. Lyudmila Zaitseva, 
“networks trafficking in drugs, weapons, and other illicit commodities are well suited for 
nuclear smuggling.”  She argues this because of their “experience in avoiding detection, 
knowledge of safe routes, protection by corrupt authorities, and established 
infrastructures.”95 
A recent Strategic Studies Institute report mirrors the assertions that North 
Korea’s criminal networks are involved in activities that can further procurement of illicit 
goods.  According to the report, North Korean cargo vessels routinely “rendezvous with 
Japanese vessels in North Korean territorial waters to transfer narcotics for Japanese 
organized crime groups.  In another example, the report states that the North Korean 
“merchant fleet” has been used to transfer drugs for weapons.”96  It is reasonable to 
assume that this interaction could lead to the transfer of material that could be used in a 
North Korean nuclear program.  This type of exchange could easily occur in the Arabian 
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Gulf.  Vessels that are under U.N. scrutiny routinely visit Iran’s territorial waters.  
Without a monitoring agency, these vessels could rendezvous at sea with Iranian vessels 
with impunity.  The same could be said throughout the Arabian Gulf because Iranian 
ships transit to and from the GCC on a daily basis, and an Iranian vessel stopping at sea 
could easily be articulated to whoever is watching as mechanical troubles. 
A GCC media outlet published an article wherein they describe maritime 
trafficking in Oman as being robust, and based on the characteristics, an ideal match for 
those involved in smuggling illicit material.   According to the report, weekly, Iranian 
boats illegally arrive to an isolated port on the Musandam Peninsula to offload cargo 
without law enforcement scrutiny.  The majority of cargo is centered on basic criminality: 
heroin, hashish, and cigarettes, yet the article further argues that these boats conduct 
smuggling transactions that “are in breach of international sanctions against Iran.”  An 
Omani Coast Guard member stated in the article that stopping these Iranian boats from 
transiting to and from the Islamic Republic is like “searching for needles in a haystack 
because it is impossible to stop and search every vessel.”97  In an environment where 
small ports exist outside the normal state run port structures, stopping the exporting of 
illicit cargo is extremely challenged.  For example, in Morocco criminal networks are 
building their own ports simply to provide a means of exporting hashish.98  Unless GCC 
law enforcement is fully entrenched in the ports and waterways that exist outside of the 
state-run structures, traffickers will have the ability to transport whatever cargo they 
desire, even if that cargo is sanctioned under UNSCR 1803 and 1929. 
Dr. Zaitseva argues that there is a merging of international terrorist organizations 
and organized crime because of the latter’s usage of established trafficking networks, 
which allow for a relatively easy means of transport.  Dr. Zaitseva states that organized 
crime has branched out from regular criminality because of a  “demand-driven smuggling 
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model” that centers on moving whatever product will allow for profit gain.   For example, 
in 2002 Kazakhstan law enforcement arrested smugglers transporting heroin and uranium 
oxide via the Silk Road.  In 2005, Indian law enforcement arrested smugglers of opiates 
who were also smuggling depleted uranium.  Dr. Zaitseva asserts that these incidents 
represent a merging of common traffickers with weapons procurers, and one area that is 
of concern are ports and harbors because  “maritime shipments may be used because of 
weak border control at ports and the relative ease of moving heavy containers by sea 
rather than by land.”99  In the Arabian Gulf this threat is significant because of:  a history 
of legitimate maritime trade with the nation targeted under UNSCR 1803 and 1929, a 
mixing of national identities that favors the targeted nation, and an extensive criminal 
smuggling network that easily transports goods to and from the targeted nation.   
One of the most notorious examples that emphasize this threat is the A.Q. Khan 
network.  Security scholar, Gordon Corera states that Western intelligence services 
obtained information that a “consignment of important goods” had arrived to Dubai’s free 
trade zone aboard the cargo vessel M/V BBC China.   The containers of interest were 
previously loaded in Malaysia through global links that Khan had established.  After 
departing Dubai, the vessel was searched in Italy where the containers of interest were 
opened. Inside the containers were “aluminum components-positioners, casings, and 
pumps,” which only “a trained expert would have known that these were for a centrifuge, 
the device that enriches uranium.”100  This is a problem that exists throughout the GCC 
port systems.  Historic trade has led to cargo for Iran not being 100% searched, and when 
it is, South Asian and Ajam inspectors do not realize the significance of “aluminum 
components.”  The same is true for the smuggling networks that extend from unofficial 
ports.  The typical Iranian dhow captain is not concerned that he transporting “aluminum 
components” to Iran.  
In 1987, A.Q. Khan met with Iranian government representatives based in Dubai 
to discuss terms on transferring nuclear related information.  Dubai was chosen because it 
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was a central location where Khan did most of his regional agreements, and in the 1970s, 
Khan used Dubai to import needed material for Pakistan’s nuclear program.  During these 
transactions, “front companies” in the maritime shipping environment were extensively 
used.  Members of Khan’s network transported needed parts to Dubai then to Iran via 
Iranian owned vessels.101 Most likely these vessels belonged to the Islamic Republic of 
Iran Shipping Lines; a company directly sanctioned under UNSCR 1803 and 1929, and 
that has been a partner in joint shipping ventures with Ajami owned shipping businesses 
in the GCC.  According to Gilbert King, A.Q. Khan used criminal organizations to 
transport much of the material needed in the nuclear programs of his customers.  One of 
those who assisted him was Dawood Ibrahim who owned an extensive shipping network 
in Dubai, which included “front companies for drugs and weapons,” as well as who 
controlled a large drug trafficking network along the Pakistan and Afghanistan border.102  
One of those in his network was Sayed abu Tahir bin Bukhary, who’s uncle Mohamed 
Farouk owned a business in Dubai that was associated with A.Q. Khan’s network.  
According to Bukhary’s own statement, he received needed equipment for nuclear 
programs through other “legitimate” trading businesses that operated in the GCC.103 
As shown, the developed illegal maritime smuggling network in the Arabian Gulf 
is diverse in the national identities that facilitate its success.  Drug traffickers not only use 
individual supply linkages, but also capitalize on legitimate shipping in the region.  Both 
procurers, as well as suppliers of technology needed for a nuclear program, can easily 
exploit these modes of transport.  Based on UNSCR 1803 and 1929 having sections that 
relate to international shipping, any criminal network that furthers illicit smuggling 
directly undermines the success of both resolutions.  The next chapter of this thesis 
examines the enforceability of UNSCR 1803 and 1929, and provides insight into 
incidents and means of overcoming policing challenges. 
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V. POLICING IRANIAN SANCTIONS IN THE MARITIME 
DOMAIN 
This chapter details the use of sanctions as a policy tool towards Iran historically, 
and defines the law enforcement mechanisms associated with policing both resolutions in 
the Arabian Gulf.  There have been several instances throughout the Islamic Republic’s 
history where policy choices were based on a specific level of coercion.  In order to fully 
place UNSCR 1803 and 1929 into context, an analysis of where they fit in a “use of 
force” model is necessary, because like policing, a person or nation goes through a 
hierarchy of options based on the level of aggression an adversary is taking.  Logically, 
one must start with the lowest level necessary for compliance based on the totality of 
circumstances surrounding the incident, and subsequently move up levels of coercion 
accordingly.  The Iranian government has responded to certain behavior requests in the 
past, and defining the parameters those requests were made in, can give a policy maker 
more options if it is deemed that UNSCR 1803 and 1929 are ultimately ineffective in the 
Arabian Gulf’s maritime domain.   
If the use of force is one pillar in law enforcement, investigative ability comprises 
another.  As briefly explained in the previous chapter, both resolutions are challenged in 
the Arabian Gulf from their inception.  Historic maritime trade, national identities, and 
smuggling networks have impacted their enforceability.  What this chapter will 
demonstrate is how those characteristics have violated both resolutions, as well as how 
certain policing strategies can be implemented in order to diminish further incidents from 
occurring. 
A. SANCTIONS IN THE USE OF FORCE MODEL 
The different variables that can impact the success of UNSCR 1803 and 1929 
emphasize the importance of thoroughly studying the use of sanctions as a policy choice.  
If certain sanctions are ultimately ineffective, then the chances of the outcome that the 
sanctions were trying to prevent actually occurring increase dramatically.  When 
determining the best course of action to use on an individual actor or nation in order to 
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ensure compliance, the options available primarily include negotiation, deterrence, 
coercive diplomacy (sanctions), and the use of military force.  UNSCR 1803 and 1929 
fall into the category of using coercive diplomacy to alter a course of action that the 
Iranian government already implemented or undertook: attempting to develop a nuclear 
program.104  
In the book Force and Statecraft, the authors state that negotiation is the first step 
in the use of force model, and is compared to verbally defusing a situation in order to 
maintain stability.  During the negotiation phase the national representatives work 
together during official proceedings to find solutions to their particular concerns or 
grievances as a way of avoiding armed conflict altogether.  As the situation intensifies, 
national leaders may move to the next phase: deterrence. Deterrence relies on the 
potential use of armed force in order to deter an adversary from taking positive steps 
towards achieving whatever goal they set out to for.  An example of deterrence would be 
a nation’s leader deciding to raise troop or fleet levels in a particular part of the world to 
deter another nation from increasing their influence.  The key to deterrence is that it must 
be undertaken prior to an adversary’s questionable actions, and is also used as a means of 
avoiding armed conflict.  For deterrence to be effective, the raising of military levels 
must cause an adversary to think twice about their actions, and therefore, realize the 
potential losses if they undertake them.105 
When deterrence fails, a national leader may choose to intensify options through 
implementing coercive diplomacy (sanctions), which is similar to deterrence except the 
adversary has already undertaken an aggressive step that must be undone.  The goal of 
this option is to use an authoritative and powerful presence to cause an adversary to 
reverse their actions in order to avoid armed conflict.  One of the problems with this 
option is that it could lead to a situation intensifying even more as an adversary refuses to 
back down and tensions escalate to the point where accidental aggression occurs.106  
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Historian Peter Paret argues that when an adversary chooses to ignore all attempts to 
change their behavior, armed conflict and violence can be the result.  Specific social, 
political, and economic events that occur in the involved nations at that particular time 
affect the decision to take this action.  A populace may not want to fight, a political party 
in power may use the conflict to garner support, or a struggling economy may use the war 
as a chance to spark development or gain resources.107 
Throughout the Islamic Republic’s history, several incidents have occurred 
wherein the use of force model has been tested.  Based on some of the outcomes, the 
question is raised about whether UNSCR 1803 and 1929 are even necessary in the 
Arabian Gulf.  If both resolutions are challenged from their inception, than maybe 
another course of action is necessary to deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions.   For example, 
during the negotiations of the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979, the Iranian government was 
responsive to U.S. release requests, but only after something tangible was offered in 
return.  Karen Feste describes these as being interest-based negotiations.  For the Iranian 
government, failing to comply meant losing a U.S. brokered arms deal.108  Ambassador 
John Limbert, a hostage of the Iranian siege, advises that Iranian negotiators will not 
respond to the use of legal references when an adversary issues demands.  UNSCR 1803 
and 1929 possibly fall into this category.  The reasoning behind the ignoring of legality 
stems from a combination of Iran’s newly installed Islamic government drastically 
working to remove all evidence of a Western-based legal system, and emphasizing the 
primacy of Islamic law.109 
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B. UNDERSTANDING UNSCR 1803 AND 1929 
            In an International Institute for Strategic Studies publication, Brendan Taylor 
argues that economic sanctions have been used throughout history, and are still effective 
as a policy tool in today’s international relations.  As Taylor states, most scholarship on 
sanctions centers on the overall strategies of sanctions, or their possibility of being 
effective based on various theoretical models.110  What is ignored is the research based 
on the enforceability of the sanction within a foreign law enforcement agency.  Some 
scholars argue that when other nations are not willing to participate in enforcement, the 
sanctioned nation is able to find a work around via established illicit and smuggling 
networks, as well as “third party suppliers,” or they will develop strategies that expand 
trade relations to nations that are willing to ignore the restrictions documented in the 
sanctions.111  It can be argued that these scenarios represent the current situation in the 
Arabian Gulf.  Other scholars argue that in order for a sanction to be successful, policy 
analysts and those involved in the sanction’s implementation must understand the trade 
connections that exist in the area where the sanctions are being implemented.112  This 
thesis adds to that research through analyzing historic and current maritime trade trends 
that are prevalent between the GCC and Iran. 
           As background, information about Iran’s nuclear program reached the forefront 
internationally after an Iranian anti-regime group revealed details about two clandestine 
nuclear facilities.  Subsequent International Atomic Energy Agency examinations 
verified that Iran had a location in Natanz for uranium enrichment, and in Arak for the 
heavy water process needed in nuclear development.  As a result, concerns grew in the 
international community about Iran attempting to become a nuclear power.  In response, 
the Iranian government argued that the locations were not for weapons production, but 
only for increasing the energy capabilities of the nation.  Taylor asserts that this argument 
was not logical because Iran had an abundance of other natural resources that would fuel 
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the needed energy requirements.  Furthermore, Taylor explains that the suspicious nature 
of the two locations, both being considered secret, added to the accusations that Iran’s 
programs were for nuclear weapons.  Even though the international community became 
proactive in attempting to ascertain all of the details of their program, the Iranian 
government stood defiant to the world’s demands, and continued in the uranium 
enrichment processes; basically ignoring the requests of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency.  As a result, the United Nations issued the predecessor to UNSCR 1803 and 
1929 with the passing of UNSCR 1737, which has similar sections focused on Iran’s 
global ability to procure needed materials for their nuclear program.113 
Like UNSCR 1737, both UNSCR 1803 and 1929 are specific to the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran, as well as the uranium enrichment processes.  
Paramount in all of these resolutions is the need for countries to limit the activity of 
Iranian entities operating outside of Iran that may be involved in furthering their nuclear 
program.  This is accomplished through stopping the procurement of goods that are 
designed for this industry, or limiting access to dual-use technology that is derived from 
benign machinery, but could subsequently be used in various weapons systems.  
Furthermore, nations are expected to police all exports from their country to ensure 
sanctioned material is not being delivered to Iran, as well as proactively inspect maritime 
cargo arriving from Iran.  Of most concern are Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines’ 
vessels and their various subsidiaries because of their documented history in directly 
participating in the procurement process.  Additionally, countries are expected to use the 
guidelines of the Law of the Sea to verify that Iranian cargo is not transporting sanctioned 
material.  Both resolutions state that countries are only to inspect if there is reason to 
believe Iranian cargo is carrying illicit material, yet based on Iran’s history of using its 
civil fleet for non-civilian cargo, there is enough reasonable suspicion to assume that all 
cargo from Iran should be proactively inspected.114 
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Both UNSCR 1803 and 1929 resulted from the Iranian government ignoring the 
guidelines set forth in the international community regarding their nuclear program, and 
were designed to make the cost very high for the Iranian government’s refusal to 
participate in international norms.  Both were implemented to complement the continual 
diplomatic efforts, yet both aggressively attempt to freeze the assets of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, their affiliates, Iranian companies working in 
furtherance of the nuclear program through deception, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps, as well as proactively monitor through law enforcement all business transactions 
of each party previously mentioned.115  In simplest terms, both were implemented in 
order to act as a bulwark against Iranian government attempts to obtain the necessary 
materials for a nuclear program, as well as to limit the furtherance of Iran’s enrichment 
program.   
The sections listed in the resolution specifically target the following Iranian 
government activities: investment in any foreign nuclear programs, attempts to procure 
certain conventional weapons systems through direct purchase or technical assistance, 
attempts to develop a ballistic missile program, and attempts to obtain dual use 
technology that could be used in the aforementioned programs.  Furthermore, 
participating states are required to increase proactive law enforcement search and seizure 
capabilities to limit the aforementioned Iranian activity, limiting maritime port services to 
questionable Iranian vessels and other flagged vessels suspected of violating this 
resolution, monitoring the activities of Iranian companies and banks operating within 
their nation, preventing Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps business activity, and 
freezing the assets of several suspect Iranian individuals and companies.116 
C. POLICING UNSCR 1803 AND 1929 
Dr. Jay Albanese in his work Transnational Crime and the 21st Century, states 
that globalization led to the “reduction and removal of barriers among national borders to 
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facilitate the flow of goods, services, funds, and labor.” 117 As shown in Chapter II of this 
thesis, in the Arabian Gulf those borders were never present.  As some scholars argue, the 
Arabian Gulf region has been “globalized” since “time immemorial.”118  Prior to 
defining the term globalization, the GCC countries and Iran were already using the facets 
of globalization in their own regional maritime economy.  This means that when 
attempting to police trade between the GCC and Iran, the same tactics and strategies used 
prior to globalization are still germane in post-globalization times.  Furthermore, Dr. 
Albanese states that “social, political, economic events in one part of the world directly 
impact the other.”119  In the Arabian Gulf, maritime trade between Iran and the GCC 
continues without interruption regardless of international events.  For example, the 
GCC’s United Arab Shipping Company and Sima Tech run a circular trade route 
throughout the Arabian Gulf on a weekly basis even though the U.N. has imposed 
restrictive sanctions on Iran.  This emphasizes that the GCC and Iran are somewhat in 
their own distinct world, where policing techniques need to be regionally based, and 
account for the internal Gulf globalization characteristics. 
Dr. Albanese further states that describing “both transnational and organized 
crime around the world in ethnic terms should be avoided because “it fails to explain the 
existence of the activity itself.”120 This thesis agrees with that statement, because as 
shown everything from trade to drug smuggling undermines UNSCR 1803 and 1929; 
however, in the Arabian Gulf ignoring national identity could be disastrous for stopping 
illicit activity.  For example, when looking at UNSCR 1803 and 1929, a Sunni Arab is 
logically not going to violate either resolution with malicious intent for ideological 
reasons.  They may violate them inadvertently through the normal maritime trade 
transactions that are common in the region, or they may facilitate activity for monetary 
greed.  Yet, some Ajam have and will continue to violate these sanctions intentionally for 
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pro-Iranian reasons.  For a law enforcement officer, the identity of GCC residents is an 
important part of policing. 
  For example, in 2009 Baktash Fattahi was arrested in the United States for 
transferring military aircraft parts to Iran that were intended to be used in various sections 
of the Iranian military.  Acting with Fattahi was an Ajam living in Dubai that was 
operating through various shipping companies in Dubai that had connections to Iranian 
businesses.  During this investigation it was uncovered that Iranian government assets 
tasked Fattahi with obtaining parts for the F14 fighter jet, as well as the AH-1, CH-53, 
and UH-1 helicopters.121 If one learning point could come from this incident, it would be 
the importance of GCC law enforcement initiating community policing strategies that 
intertwine the Ministry of Interior with members of the shipping community, specifically 
those shipping personnel that are of the Ajam community.  Policing shipping in a port 
environment is a complex task that overwhelmingly favors criminal elements over law 
enforcement.  To pull the odds in favor of the police, it is imperative to fully link all areas 
of the port environment with the authorities. Without this tactic, the sheer number of 
ships, cargo, and crew will absolutely overwhelm any proactive policing efforts. 
In his article “The Five Wars of Globalization,” Moises Naim lists the clandestine 
movement of drugs, guns, people, intellectual property, and money as being a serious 
threat to national security.  Naim states that these problems are the overshadowed threat 
because emphasis has been centered on international terrorism.  He further argues that the 
overall benefits of globalization on the world economy directly led to the increase of the 
illicit market because of new avenues of movement, more transportation, more banking, 
the internet, more travel, etc.122 Absolutely, globalization increased trade networks.  It 
was not that long ago that a Soviet cargo ship would not be allowed in a U.S. port; 
however, in the Arabian Gulf these maritime transportation links have always been 
present.  What is new could be the access of Western and Asian markets to the Arabian 
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Gulf for goods other than oil.  Within this framework the movement of illicit material 
documented under UNSCR 1803 and 1929 could capitalize on this growth of trade 
networks through one legitimate mode:  international shipping.  For example, in 2008 
Russian law enforcement arrested an Uzbekistan national for his involvement in the 
attempted smuggling of dual-use Tantalum aboard a Russian cargo vessel.  The end user 
of the shipment was in Iran.123  If that ship was not interdicted, the illicit Tantalum cargo 
could have easily arrived to an Iranian port, or to the GCC for subsequent re-export.  
In a 2009 example, Abu Dhabi port security officials seized a shipment of 
weapons from the Bahamian flagged cargo vessel, M/V ANL Australia.  Reportedly, the 
vessel transited from North Korea to the United Arab Emirates with an ultimate 
destination of Iran.124  One learning point this incident shows is that when a GCC law 
enforcement entity takes aggressive and proactive policing efforts to thwart Iranian 
activity, the chances of UNSCR 1803 and 1929 being successful obviously increase.  One 
of the major reasons why this incident occurred is Abu Dhabi’s current political stance 
towards Iran.  According to Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment, Abu Dhabi is 
taking serious efforts to limit Iranian influence in their Emirate.  This focus has also 
impacted efforts in Dubai.  Due to increased pressure from the West and neighboring 
Abu Dhabi, Dubai has begun to focus law enforcement efforts on UNSCR 1803 and 
1929; however, as a result many influential Dubai Arabs and Ajam in the community 
have begun to speak out because of the potential affects this action will have on their 
company profits.125 This backlash emphasizes how difficult it is for GCC law 
enforcement to overcome the historic trade that has occurred for generations with Iran, 
especially in Dubai. 
Bloomberg journalist Kambiz Foroohar states that the Iranian Business Council of 
Dubai, an organization fueled via the local Ajam presence, actively promotes trade 
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relations between Iran and the local Arab community.  Furthermore, Foroohar asserts that 
currently in Dubai there are approximately 8000 Iranian businesses, 1200 of which are 
involved in trade between the two regions.  Adding to the security complexities are “front 
companies” that operate as direct maritime shippers of goods to Iran, or operate as 
forwarders of goods to Iran that arrived to Dubai first; meaning a vessel can offload illicit 
material in Dubai, and that material can subsequently be forwarded to Iran via, as what 
Foroohar states is “Iran Air.”  Similar to most of the GCC, Iranian businesses in Dubai 
must have a local citizen as a partner who owns more than half of the company; however, 
this relationship adds more challenges because it requires a Dubai citizen to jeopardize 
their potential monetary earnings through supporting the Iran restricting sections of 
UNSCR 1803 and 1929, as well as supporting proactive domestic and international law 
enforcement efforts.126 This Dubai business leadership requirement explains why there 
was backlash in Dubai from owners of companies over pressure from Abu Dhabi to 
enforce both resolutions.  According to Karim Sadjadpour, Dubai officials conceded 
saying that the monitoring of maritime trade would only hurt the Dubai economy, which 
is made up of many joint Iranian and Dubai companies.127 
The problem for law enforcement is some of those joint Arab-Iranian companies, 
as well as those that are strictly Ajami owned via the free-trade zone, are considered 
“front companies” for Iranian procurement networks of illicit material.  According to Dr. 
Emanuele Ottolenghi those front companies “serve as conduits for illegal procurement” 
of “advanced weaponry and sensitive technology.”128  In one investigation, German law 
enforcement arrested Mohsen Vanaki, an Ajam in Germany, for transporting dual-use 
military and nuclear technology to Iran.  Allegedly, Vanaki used a shipping company to 
procure equipment and technology from Western nations to Iran via a Dubai “front 
company” that ultimately sent them to a suspect Iranian company.  To facilitate the 
transport of goods, Vanaki used false documents, and labeled the equipment with an 
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ultimate destination of a university in the Middle East.129  This investigation resulted 
from German law enforcement efforts.  To multiply the effectiveness of international 
policing, GCC Customs Divisions from each country need to expand their presence to 
Western nations in order to ensure that GCC law enforcement can dismantle pro-Iranian 
shipping networks that are operating on their home soil.    
Drs. Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann state in their book Policing the Globe 
that the previously named U.S. Customs, now part of the Department of Homeland 
Security, focused efforts on establishing multi-national working partnerships in order to 
assist in stopping the exporting of illicit cargo to the United States.  In addition, Customs 
agents worked towards convincing foreign law enforcement that certain criminal activity 
was illegal in the United States, and therefore, should be policed by law enforcement 
agencies throughout the world.130  This is where GCC law enforcement needs to increase 
their efforts.  Placing a GCC Customs agent in a Western equivalent will assist in 
stopping illicit cargo going to Iran; however, in order for that policy to be effective GCC 
law enforcement needs to overcome the historic trade their individual nation has with 
Iran.  UNSCR 1803 and 1929 are not part of international law, but they do need to be 
enforced based on international expectations.  Convincing GCC countries to put historic 
trade and ethnic links second to a U.N. resolution is a difficult task.  Drs. Andreas and 
Nadelmann summarize best in their quote, “As long as the power to make and unmake 
criminal laws remains in the hands of states rather than supranational institutions, laws 
and their enforcement will always vary from one state to another depending on different 
and ever-changing moral notions and perceptions of foreign and domestic risks and 
threats.”131 
Of most concern in the Arabian Gulf is policing the activities of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and its subsidiaries, which are all specifically named in 
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UNSCR 1803 and 1929.  According to the U.S. Department of Treasury, this Iranian 
shipping line purposefully operates in the maritime environment as a means around 
sanctions, something that is accomplished via front companies, subsidiaries, and 
affiliates.  Based on Executive Order 13382, several United Arab Emirates based 
shipping companies were designated as directly facilitating this endeavor.132  Treasury 
further asserts that the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines became a target for 
sanctions because the company is reported to use its civilian maritime fleet in support of 
Iranian military operations.  Specifically, their vessels are alleged to be primary 
transporters of procured items that can be used in Iran’s nuclear program.  In order to 
transport cargo without the scrutiny of international law enforcement, these vessels 
continually change the identity of their ships.  This attempted deception usually occurs 
through the practice of changing the vessel’s name, as well as the country in which the 
vessel is flagged.133  In regard to the GCC, that means a vessel from this fleet could enter 
a port under a non-Iranian flag, with a non-Iranian name, with changed vessel markings, 
and load sanctioned cargo without any authority official even knowing it occurred.  
 Dr. Khadija Sharife states that foreign maritime corporations like those in Iran 
use flags of convenience to hide maritime trade activities. As shown, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines is known for using various national flags on their vessels 
to avoid law enforcement scrutiny.  According to the U.N. Law of the Sea, there must be 
a legitimate link between the vessel and the nation that it is flagged under.  If this is 
cannot be ascertained than local law enforcement authorities have necessary probable 
cause to take proactive policing actions.  Dr. Sharife states that ownership is the problem 
because it is difficult to ascertain who the real owner of the vessel is, and therefore, flags 
of convenience can be used to move illicit material and further criminal activity.134  The 
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U.S. Department of Treasury states that those “in the maritime industry should be aware 
that assisting the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, or its blocked affiliates in re-
flag their vessels” could lead to Treasury designation under current laws.135  A 2010 New 
York Times report emphasizes the complexity of policing this fleet.  According to the data 
provided, there are approximately 65 shipping companies that are directly affiliated with 
the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines.  These companies are incorporated in Iran, 
Hong Kong, Malta, Isle of Man, Germany, and Cyprus.  Several of these companies have 
branched into other affiliates that are now incorporated in Panama.136   
This mixing of flags, different nations of incorporation, subsidiaries, and affiliates 
makes enforcing U.N. resolutions on Iran a difficult task in the maritime domain.  In the 
Arabian Gulf it is challenged even more because it must combat historic trade links, 
national identity, and smuggling networks.  In the United States, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran Shipping Lines would not be able to establish a presence in a port; however, in the 
Arabian Gulf it is not an uncommon, or an abnormal occurrence for this shipping line or 
its associated companies to establish a presence in a GCC port.  To many in the shipping 
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If an analytical model could be provided to law enforcement agencies charged 
with enforcing international sanctions in the maritime domain, the variables of historic 
trade, identity, and smuggling networks need to be accounted for.  There are other factors 
that influence policing success, but this thesis focuses primarily on these three because in 
the Arabian Gulf, these standout as being the significant challenges.  Enforcing a UN 
resolution, or any security policy, is a complex task.  The success is reliant upon 
everything from a nation’s specific history to the ethnic makeup of its’ population.  As 
shown in this thesis, accomplishing the goals set forth in UNSCR 1803 and 1929 are 
extremely vulnerable to the demographics of GCC law enforcement and shipping 
communities, its history in maritime trade, as well as the characteristics of the illegal drug 
trade.  These challenges are difficult to overcome, especially since the examination of 
maritime activity overseas is sometimes a second priority to a foreign nation’s security 
policies.  Based on these challenges, it is incumbent upon policy makers to understand 
the effectiveness of a security program at the lowest level.   In the case of this thesis, the 
lowest level is found at the individual enforcement officer, the individual maritime 
business, and the individual drug trafficker and user. 
A national leader has several tools at his or her disposal for changing and 
influencing suspect behavior.  Throughout the history of interactions between the United 
States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, many stages of policy choices have been used 
against the Iranian government to change their actions; each with different results.  One 
of those tactics routinely attempted are sanctions; however, the overall opinion of this 
policy choice is susceptible to analyst optimism based on misleading facts at the lowest 
level.  For sanctions to be effective, all possible variables to enforcement need to be 
accounted for.  In the case of UNSCR 1803 and 1929, those variables are historical trade, 
identity, and smuggling networks; each of which ultimately impacts the overall success 




A. HISTORIC MARITIME TRADE 
As Dr. Dionisius Agius states, the historic trade between the GCC and Iran has 
created a scenario where countries have become a mixture of culture and nationalities, 
where the predominance of “seafarers” created a diverse society along identity lines.  
Agius further argues that these historic trade links led to an influx of Iranians who 
facilitated the maritime trade between the two regions, to the point where most of the 
dhows found in the GCC flew Iranian flags.  Even in Bahrain where there is continuous 
tension with Iran, Agius emphasizes the primacy of the Iranian dhow trade through re-
exports.  Agius explains that throughout the GCC, machinery and electronics arrive from 
other countries, and are subsequently transported to Iran.137  It is this scenario that must 
be emphasized for its relevance to this thesis.  Benign machinery and electronics could be 
used as dual-use technology for Iranian nuclear and military programs.  If there is an 
Ajam or South Asian working as a stevedore who is not concerned with UNSCR 1803 
and 1929, or does not understand the enforceability of each, dual-use technology could be 
shipped as cargo without scrutiny through established maritime trade networks between 
the GCC and Iran. 
Historically, trade trends between Iran and Gulf countries have been increasing 
for years, the only exception being the slight decline after the issuing of several U.N. 
resolutions targeting Iran; however, there are enough maritime alternatives and monetary 
demand throughout the Gulf countries to keep the trade links with Iran connected even 
after sanctions have been imposed.   Within this trade environment, maritime shipping is 
the primary means for transporting goods; both through legitimate and illegal fleets.  To 
emphasize the extent of trade between the two regions, and therefore the possibility of 
working around UNSCR 1803 and 1929, Nader Habibi of Brandeis University uses the 
following International Monetary Fund statistics of the GCC nation with arguably the 
most ideological differences when compared to Iran:  
In 1995, Saudi Arabia exported to Iran approximately 21 million USD worth of 
goods.  In 2008 that number rose to 615 million USD, and subsequently dropped in 2009 
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to 418 million USD.  In 1995 Iran exported to Saudi Arabia approximately 60 million 
USD worth of goods.  In 2008 that number rose to 901 million USD, and subsequently 
dropped in 2009 to 612 million USD.138  Within this trade, maritime shipping played an 
extensive role, and based on the sheer amount of goods being transported, there was 
ample opportunity for the goals of UNSCR 1803 and 1929 to be undermined. 
B. IDENTITY 
As shown in this thesis, a complete understanding of UNSCR 1803 and 1929 in 
the GCC today cannot be accomplished without examining the Ajam and South Asian 
communities.  It is evident that regional trade and the events that occurred in Iran’s 
history were the catalyst that pushed many Iranian families to the GCC for legitimate 
economic purposes, thereby establishing the foundation for family and business links that 
transcend GCC nationality.  Due to the GCC’s openness to the Iranian population, the 
Ajam community was able to absorb into the GCC’s bureaucracy, establish successful 
corporations, and develop into various positions of influence.  This absorption came at a 
cost though, as some members of the Ajam community could not release from their pro-
Iranian identity.  Furthermore, as this thesis shows the connection to Iran of some GCC 
citizens influenced some members of law enforcement to not support either resolution 
with maximum effort.   The GCC’s history with oil led to a scenario where the South 
Asian population came to the Gulf to find work, which resulted in many being placed in 
positions where they assist Customs Divisions in enforcing both resolutions. That 
phenomenon resulted in vulnerabilities in the success of UNSCR 1803 and 1929 because 
this community was not trained in policing, and many did not understand what the goals 
or purpose of either resolution was based on. 
C. DRUG SMUGGLING NETWORKS 
Illegal drugs enter the GCC from Iran, as well as from outside the Arabian Gulf 
through maritime means.  These networks undermine the goals of UNSCR 1803 and 
1929 because they create venues where smugglers of sanctioned material can capitalize 
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on existing networks.  According to Dr. John Anthony, Iranian merchants do use dhows 
for smuggling, and within the approximate 2500 Iranian dhows that Anthony states are 
involved in trade with the GCC each year, the potential exists for dual-use technology to 
be transported to Iran via established smuggling networks.139 Evidence indicates that 
criminal networks, as well as procurers and suppliers of sanctioned material are 
becoming intertwined.  The extensive network of A.Q. Khan shows how a provider of 
technology, legitimate shipping in the Arabian Gulf, drug traffickers, and criminals can 
work together to transfer material to not only Iran, but also other questionable nations. 
D. ENFORCEMENT OUTLOOK 
Today in the GCC countries, vessels are taking on cargo for shipment to Iran.  
Based on reasons shown, maritime cargo will continue to be transported without 
interruption.  As reinforced throughout this thesis, the ability to police UNSCR 1803 and 
1929 will need to overcome the obstacles of legitimate trade, identity, as well as the 
continuing illegal drug market that is growing in the Gulf.  It is important that policy 
makers in the United States understand the enforceability of both resolutions at the street 
level in the Gulf to ensure that a false sense of security does not develop about the 
effectiveness of UNSCR 1803 and 1929.  Law enforcement agencies in the GCC are 
partners in limiting Iranian activity; however, as a whole GCC nations are susceptible to 
their own specific history and culture.  This is not a bad phenomenon, for it is their 
region, yet the United States will need to develop advanced law enforcement policies in 
order to ensure that the voids in enforcing UNSCR 1803 and 1929 are filled. 
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